19 June 2026
(IMAGE: AI)
During her first visit to Ukraine in May of this year, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said she would like to visit Odesa and other Ukrainian cities: “It’s very important to be here from time to time, because I’m deeply impressed by the resilience and strength of the Ukrainian people. And in order to draw inspiration from your courage and tireless spirit, I need to be here more often.”
The politician’s rhetoric—both on social media and during the press conference she gave to Ukrainian journalists—differs significantly from what Russian opposition politicians say about Ukraine.
For instance, she supports the Kalinovsky Regiment, which is fighting in Ukraine. In contrast, Russians such as Yulia Navalnaya, Ilya Yashin, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and others say they do not consider armed resistance against Putin to be important to them. Some even go so far as to make derogatory remarks about members of the Russian volunteer corps.
Tikhanovskaya calls Alexander Lukashenko an illegitimate president and does not address him as “Mr. President” when pleading with him to end the war. The politician says that Belarus needs Ukraine to win and notes that both countries are standing up to imperialist Russia. In contrast, most Russian opposition figures see no problem with Russian imperialism at all.
And most importantly: Tikhanovskaya acknowledges that, as a nation, Belarusians share responsibility for Belarus being drawn into the war: “Lukashenko is to blame for what happened, but we share responsibility for allowing Lukashenko to come to power and for failing to dismantle this system over the past 30 years,” she said.
And what about the Belarusian opposition media? It is well known that Russian opposition outlets are often accused of distortions, manipulation, and even spreading Kremlin narratives when it comes to covering events in Ukraine. As for Odesa, some of them consider it part of the “Russian World,” at least culturally. We recently saw that one of the leading media outlets, Meduza, views Odesa through an imperial lens.
In this article, we’ll analyze what exactly Belarusian opposition outlets are writing about Odesa. What are the main themes, how do they report on Russian attacks, and what else do they mention?
Let’s start with the oldest publication, “Nasha Niva.” This brand has been known to Belarusians since 1906. It was thanks to this newspaper that the standards of the Belarusian language were established. The first issue was published in Vilnius and was inspired by the national liberation movements that had begun at that time in the Russian Empire. The newspaper ceased publication in 1915 due to the German occupation of Vilnius. In 1991, the newspaper was revived, but under Lukashenko’s regime, it faced constant harassment. Since 2006, it has been published online. In 2020, the newspaper was blocked following protests, and some of its staff were arrested. It is currently published abroad.
What immediately stands out is its skeptical attitude toward Russians. One article features a Russian woman who criticized Minsk. Among the most popular is a piece about a Russian driver who covered part of his license plate with a glove. “The owner demonstrated yet another example of the arrogance of Russian drivers,” the publication writes.
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<i><span><span><span>SCREENSHOTS of articles by Nasha Niva about Russians</span></span></span></i>
Among the articles about Odesa, most focus on Russian missile strikes. The publication bases its information on official Ukrainian sources or media and does not include “explanations” from the Russian Ministry of Defense, as Russian independent media often do. Therefore, there is no doubt as to what was the target of the shelling—civilians or NATO bases with mercenaries.
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<i><span><span><span>SCREENSHOT of a post by Nasha Niva about the shelling of Odesa on April 16, 2026</span></span></span></i>
Several articles focus on the cultural sphere. They mention the Palladium club, where a song by Belarusian rappers in Russian was played. The publication notes that these rappers are currently “pursuing careers in Moscow.” This article includes a lengthy quote from Oleg Kipper, head of the Odesa Regional State Administration, and background information explaining that Ukraine has a ban on the public performance of Russian music. There are no sentiments in the article about the “abolition of great culture.”
The article also mentions Belarusian actress Vera Kavalerova, who once declared her love for Odesa and its residents, but has now starred in a film about the so-called “SVO.” “The former actress of the Lviv theater and admirer of Odesa starred in the same film as the people who are fighting against Ukraine and bombing her beloved Odesa,” the publication writes. Regarding the film, they note that it is “refined yet crude propaganda,” and that the quality of the visuals and the acting “makes you want to cry.”
Belsat is the first independent Belarusian channel, founded in 2017 under an agreement between the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Polish Public Television. It is currently banned in Belarus. Journalists from this channel have been persecuted. For example, in 2021, Lyubov Lunova and Dmitry Soltan, who were conducting a survey near the Philharmonic Hall in Minsk, were detained; a court later charged them with “petty hooliganism” and sentenced them to administrative arrest. In April of this year, Belarus released the channel’s correspondent, Andrzej Pochobut, as part of a prisoner exchange with Poland.
As for Odesa, news about shelling also dominates the channel’s coverage. The presentation is similar to that of Nasha Niva. The channel primarily relies on official Ukrainian sources and media outlets.
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<i><span><span><span>SCREENSHOT of posts about shelling in Odesa on the Belsat website</span></span></span></i>
In one of its articles about blackouts in Odesa, the publication reposted an AI-generated image that appeared in our anonymous public groups last December. The caption states that the image is fake. But for some reason, there are no other photos of darkened Ukrainian cities. Apparently, the editorial team found this particular illustration to be the most suitable.
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SCREENSHOT of an AI-generated image of a blackout in Odesa on the Belsat website
Apart from reports on shelling, there have been only a few mentions of Odesa recently.
These are the recollections of political prisoner and journalist Ihar Losik, who was released from prison last year. He describes how the full-scale invasion began. The prisoners heard cargo planes and helicopters flying overhead: “There was a constant hum in the sky.” They also heard jubilant comments from prison staff: “Kyiv is ours, Odesa is ours.” Although at that time, Lukashenko did not admit to any involvement in the full-scale invasion.
“New prisoners, who were brought to the detention center after the war had already begun, told stories about how Russian soldiers were behaving on Belarusian territory, ‘how they transported everything stolen from Ukraine and sold it here for next to nothing, how they shelled Ukraine from Belarusian territory, and how they transported the wounded and dead back.’”
Another article, from 2024, addresses the issue of so-called“Transnistria” and Russia’s inability to provide any assistance to yet another occupied territory: “Russia has neither a land nor a sea corridor to Transnistria… It would be necessary either to land a marine assault force near Odesa and fight their way through to Transnistria, or to airlift troops, crossing the airspace of Ukraine or Romania (NATO countries). Given that Russia does not fully control either the Black Sea or its airspace, both options seem almost fantastical.”
Odessa is also mentioned in the context of the sabotage of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant. The media reported on the damage to the Black Sea and the region’s environment.
This publication was partly created by the team behind the formerly popular Belarusian portal TUT.BY. Here’s what the media outlet Belsat writes about the fate of this publication in Belarus. Five years ago, on May 18, 2021, security forces raided the editorial office and arrested the portal’s staff: “On that day, the country’s largest media outlet was raided; 15 people were detained and served various terms in pretrial detention centers and under house arrest. Two female employees—Editor-in-Chief Marina Zolotova and CEO Lyudmila Chekina—were sentenced to 12 years in a penal colony.”
In addition to the shelling (the Russian strike on the maternity hospital, the Russian negotiators’ apology for the January Russian raid on the city, and attacks on ships in the Black Sea), there are reports of a mysterious sect whose members were detained by Russian security forces, the Kremlin’s dissemination of propaganda narratives about the city, and a Russian occupier codenamed “Odessa,” who was “erased.”
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<i><span><span><span>SCREENSHOT of Zerkalo’s articles on the shelling of the maternity hospital and attacks on foreign ships in the Black Sea</span></span></span></i>
The publication reports that a sect was active in St. Petersburg that prayed for Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s health. A recording of one of the prayers contains a request to protect the Ukrainian president, as well as Ukrainian regions (including the Odesa region) and… the Kursk direction.
Citing the Institute for the Study of War, journalists also reported that the Kremlin periodically spreads narratives claiming that “Odesa is a Russian city” and threatens the Odesa and Mykolaiv regions with aggression. According to experts, similar tactics were used in 2025 to justify attempts to capture the city. Although, of course, any such offensive operations seem unlikely in the near future.
One of the articles focused on the phenomenon of “zeroing” in the Russian army—the execution of “one’s own by one’s own.” One of the stories is about an occupier with the call sign “Odessa” (whether he is somehow connected to our city or not is not reported). Journalists report that he was forced to deal drugs, and when he failed to turn over the proceeds, he was beaten to death. His family was told that he “died a brave death.”
Let’s take a look at another independent media outlet—Euro Radio, which was founded in Warsaw in 2005. According to Detector Media, the radio station’s bureau was accredited in Minsk in 2009 but ceased operations in 2021. In 2022, the outlet was designated an “extremist organization” in Belarus.
News about the shelling of Odesa is also reported here with links to official sources. It is clear from the headlines and articles that it was Russia that carried out the shelling.
Overall, there are very few reports about our city. There is a text from 2025 stating that a consulate of the Belarusian People’s Republic operated in Odesa in 1918–1919, where 16,000 applications for passports of the Belarusian People’s Republic were registered.
“Why Odessa? Because men from the Belarusian provinces were sent farther from home [to fight in World War I]. They didn’t trust the locals with weapons on their own soil,” the author explains. The same article criticizes Odessa residents: it claims that in 2021, when the author was last in the city, 8 out of 10 people praised Lukashenko. However, the article does not specify how many people were surveyed or among whom the survey was conducted.
For the most part, Belarusian media outlets write about Odesa only when there are airstrikes on the city. Nevertheless, the coverage is unambiguous: it is clear that it is Russia that is attacking and that civilians are suffering.
Another positive: these media reports show that the Belarusian opposition recognizes its country’s dependence on Russia and is striving to change this situation. Perhaps the stories about rude Russian drivers in Minsk and tourists from Moscow may seem frivolous. Nevertheless, they reflect the general sentiment among those Belarusians who do not consider Lukashenko a legitimate president.
Of course, we shouldn’t idealize the situation either. After all, according to a study by Insight News, only one in four people in Belarus reads independent media. In contrast, 60% prefer publications loyal to Lukashenko.
And finally—a problematic point. Aside from the shelling, the rest of the mentions of Odesa are, in one way or another, linked to Russia: the use of the Russian language, the spread of Russian imperial stereotypes about Odesa, and reports of Russia’s desire to seize the city.
I would like to dispel this stereotype. Who, if not Belarusians, understands how Russification works and how difficult it is for an outside observer to notice a national revival in a place where, until recently, everyone saw symbols of “great” Russian culture?
Although it should be noted that the main sources of material about Odesa are either local government officials or national media outlets, and they rarely include commentary on topics other than military or, for example, economic issues. Unfortunately, even Ukrainian publications say very little about Odesa’s cultural life.
Therefore, if we want others to see not only war in Odesa but also Ukraine—a unique and multinational country—we should consider improving communication with our neighbors and finding compelling news angles and perspectives.
This article was made possible by the Fight for Facts project, implemented with financial support from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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