Gennady Suldin, CEO of "Tekhnari" Design Bureau: "We needed it yesterday, even for pennies"

They started out making binoculars for detecting missiles in March 2022, and today they are developing simulators, software for visualizing aerial threats, and jet interceptors for "suicide drones." CEO of the “Tekhnari” Design Bureau Gennadiy Suldin spoke to Intent in an interview about the flexibility of the private defense sector, his experience collaborating with the Navy’s air defense forces, and Ukraine’s technological advantage over Russia.

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Gennadiy Suldin. SCREENSHOT: Intent’s YouTube channel

Have you been fascinated by technology since childhood? Do you remember how it all began?

No. For as long as I can remember, I’ve been interested in technology. And really, anything that can be taken apart or put together. 

Do you remember, perhaps, your first childhood project?

Yes. I built something out of a children’s construction set that looked like a robot. I was very proud of it. I accidentally sat on it—it was made of aluminum—and the set crumpled. I was really upset. From the leftover pieces, I built something that looked like a little car, and it actually drove. 

Tell us about your first project that was specifically related to technology, development, and innovation.

A neighbor came over and said his black-and-white TV had broken. Somehow, at age 12, I managed to fix it. I don’t even understand how it happened. 

Did the TV work?

Yes. 

What helps you stay afloat and keep going?

First of all, I have countless positive role models—the military personnel we work for. Their examples are inspiring. It just so happens that the “Tekhnari” team collaborates with true professionals in Air Defense and Communications. They’re world-class specialists. So I’m inspired by our military personnel, the techies, and the Air Defense specialists we work with. Second, my family. Third, fishing. And fourth, music—I’m a music lover.

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Gennady Suldin. SCREENSHOT: Intent’s YouTube channel

What do you listen to most often on your headphones these days?

Not in my headphones, but in the car. There’s no one specific thing I listen to most often—it depends on my mood. It could be Count Basie, then a techno remix of Albinoni, and then Queen. 

How did the Odessa-based “Tekhnari” come to be, and what are they like today?

It all started in early March of 2022. We delivered the first volunteer aid to an Air Defense unit and met the first Air Defense soldiers of our lives. Then we met others. Then we figured out exactly what was needed. Eventually, we started volunteering. We raised money, assessed the needs, and met the specific requirements of the Air Defense unit. Our first project was binoculars for intercepting cruise missiles. They allowed us to spot a cruise missile 2–3 seconds earlier, giving us time to shoot it down. It worked—cruise missiles were successfully intercepted.

Next came digital radios. Later, the idea for “e-AAD” emerged. And eventually, we began working closely with Air Defense specialists—those who influence policy, develop combat scenarios, and analyze them. And we realized that our greatest contribution to Ukraine’s defense could come through highly targeted, selective supply of exactly what Air Defense needs right now—but the government is slow to act. Back then, dealing with the government took a very long time, and even now, things don’t always move quickly. Defense bureaucracies around the world are so entrenched and unyielding that, by comparison, Ukraine’s is practically a resort compared to what our partners have to deal with. But we had to act immediately.

That’s how it all began. Many technical and engineering professionals joined the group—both civilians and military personnel. The group evolved, first and foremost, into a team focused on generating solutions—and then implementing them. Traditionally, all military solutions around the world take a very long time and are very expensive. But we needed them yesterday—and for next to nothing. That’s a different approach. Of course, there were setbacks, but there were more victories. 

How did you manage to earn this trust?

We simply did what we promised. We studied very carefully exactly what needed to be done and consulted extensively with professionals. Why did this happen? First, as a former air defense military officer, I had some foundational knowledge. And the people who are true professionals could see who they could entrust with a task—someone who would understand it. 

Technical specifications?

Yes, because in weapons manufacturing, the technical specifications are the foundation. And if they’re outdated or inadequate, the work of many weapons makers could be ruined. War changes very quickly. That’s why we decided to get the technical specifications and expert input from those who are currently on the front lines and can analyze the situation instantly. Of course, that means the Air Force. And since we’re in Odesa, that means the Air Defense of the Ukrainian Navy. What can I say? I thank God for the professional, decent, and wonderful people we’ve met and have the honor of working with. I’m sitting here right now, remembering their faces. It’s a true blessing to be surrounded by such high-caliber specialists, such courageous people. They are real people, real men.

How has the “Tekhnari” team changed over the years of full-scale war?

About a year after we started working, a very skilled military engineer said, “You’re very good people, and we’re making it work together, but it can’t be that the group is handling important areas while you’re like two Jews in three rows.” What has changed now? There are significantly more of us now. This is no longer just one campaign or one project—it’s several areas of work. And the second generation of “Technari” members, who came and joined us alongside Andriy as the founders, are now independent managers and company leaders. I remember very well that a leader is someone alongside whom others grow. 

Do you keep track of how many projects “Tekhnari” has developed for the Ukrainian military?

Yes.

Can you share that?

I can only speak about what I’m authorized to discuss. The “Sova” and “Sova-2” night-vision kits for anti-aircraft missile systems, anti-ship missile systems, and heavy equipment. We’ve produced more than five hundred kits. The same number of “Chaika” and “Chaika-M” training systems are in operation, designed to counter all types of aerial targets, from drones to cruise missiles.

We have modernized the “Igla,” “Perun, ” and “Stinger” man-portable air defense systems. Over 1,800 MANPADS have been modernized, meaning that over 1,800 launch tubes are now equipped with thermal imagers and can operate around the clock against cruise missiles.

Our “ePPO” app has about one million users. The “Flyuger” app (which visualizes “ePPO” data) has about 700,000 users.

Is this for the military?

“Flyuger” is for everyone. It’s an open-source program that visualizes aerial targets for anyone. We developed it, of course, for mobile units, but then we realized that it doesn’t reveal any sensitive information and can be distributed to everyone. So that’s what we’re doing. The “ePPO” map, of course, is for military personnel only. Civilian “ePPO” accounts allow users to report and receive alerts about incoming threats. 

Increased danger, right?

This isn’t an increased danger for a specific region or oblast. No, it’s a vector that could be heading your way. “Something’s flying your way”—that’s what it’s called.

Based on our design, we’re developing the “Jet Interceptor” project in collaboration with the British. We’ve already had a first look at the Shahed. It’s already on combat duty. This is just the beginning. I won’t go into detail about other projects. 

Is there a development you’re most proud of?

No. Every development is simply the fulfillment of a technical task. We see that something is needed, but it doesn’t exist. People used to jokingly call us the “volunteer engineering and logistics unit of the Southern Air Command.” We’re always interested in one thing: what’s needed, and how can we improve efficiency?

At first, you’re a volunteer and you just buy what you need. Then it turns out that not everything can be bought. For example, we need to develop a targeting system for a MANPADS. We have to find specialists, build 10–15 different prototypes, and coordinate with the military. Even a system that seems as simple as the “Sova” and “Sova-2M” night-vision systems required nine iterations from the first prototype to the production version. Although you’d think, what’s so complicated about that? Even simple things have a lot of nuances. And the main nuance is that this is being developed for the military, for extremely harsh operating conditions, with no possibility of repair. It must serve as reliably and for as long as possible. The summer of 2022 taught us an approach: how to approach the project and what to buy.

There was once a discussion about searchlights for anti-aircraft crews, since machine guns didn’t have thermal imagers at all. And we had to illuminate the target somehow. We looked at various types of searchlights. What can I say? All the types of searchlights we brought in performed very well, because we only selected specialized, ruggedized products. All attempts to improvise with some theatrical props or civilian products didn’t work.

And our first major development is, of course, “ePPO.” There’s no hardware here, just software. 

Tell us more about how “ePPO” works.

Any of us can see or hear an aerial target, or hear an explosion. You simply open your smartphone, press a button, and alert the Air Force. Over nearly four years of operation, the “ePPO” system has learned to sort through the chaos of data points from civilian and military sources to determine the most likely trajectory, alert everyone along that path, and, so to speak, predict where it will fly. In the “e-Air Defense” system for the military, of course, all data on every airstrike since November 2022 is stored. It’s a solid foundation for analytics. The system can analyze anything. It can recreate waypoints and trajectories and scale up or down. The military is used to this.

In just under three weeks, the system went nationwide. We rolled it out from the south, because that’s where it was developed—and not in a vacuum. In other words, we were constantly running back and forth to consult with others. “Is this right?” “How do you want it?” “What’s convenient for you?” “No.” “How do you want it?” “Oh, you don’t know how you want it?” “Let’s figure out how you want it.” So now the fourth major version of the system is up and running. This is the 46th iteration of the server infrastructure. And the system has weathered challenges we never even imagined.

We thought the main challenge for us would be the Russians, who would interfere with the program’s operation. Nope. Our first challenge turned out to be our own idiots. Why? Because during the system’s first year, one in ten people who installed “ePPO” started clicking on every button, without having the slightest idea of their responsibility or how it works. Within a few months, those users were automatically blocked. We gradually trained the system to avoid false alerts. These were people who seemed sane, who registered using “Diia.” They were Ukrainians from within Ukraine. They weren’t trying to mislead anyone or simulate an attack. No, they were just bored. They have their hands, they have a smartphone, and they want to do something. It’s a lot of fun, after all. Now the system handles such cases very appropriately. That is, if a person abuses their right to report an air threat, their alert is simply ignored. But that person isn’t blocked and still receives the same “something’s coming your way” alerts. Even if he’s a fool, we can’t help but worry about his life and health—we have to warn him. Yes, he’s a fool, but he’s our fool. We care about him. The system has withstood several hundred Russian cyberattacks. I can report that the system repelled the last two attacks automatically, without human intervention. The enemy deployed more than five thousand server nodes; they kept gnawing away at it, gnawing, gnawing. A couple of times they slowed down the system’s operation for half an hour or an hour—that happened. We analyzed each incident and learned from it.

The system isn’t funded by the government. It’s still run entirely by volunteers—not just in development, but also in maintaining its operations. It’s supported primarily by our own money, which we earn, for example, by selling fitness equipment. Well, and over the years there have been a few targeted donations. Of course, they weren’t enough. But we’re very grateful to those people. It came at just the right time. And now we see a product that’s used by both civilians and the military—it’s designed to address today’s threats.

It’s been a very long journey. What kept you going? On the eighth day of the system’s existence, when “ePPO” had about 50,000 users, a cruise missile was shot down for the first time based on alerts from the app. The Southern Air Command immediately announced this on Facebook. Thank you for that. But after that, no one reported anything—and no one will. When you have 50,000 users and a cruise missile is shot down in just eight days, you can draw certain conclusions. Of course, what we have now isn’t quite the same as what we had back then. It’s a long road from prototype to mass-produced product. Now it’s a mass-produced product. We have the project manager for this project—his guardian angel.

How do you assess Ukraine’s technological advantages over Russia today?

I can’t assess everything—I don’t have all the information. I can assess the statistics. When cruise missiles fly over Ukraine—not from the sea, but over land—and I’m referring to large cruise missiles like the Kh-101 or “Kalibr”—we’ve already gotten used to hit rates of 90% or higher, right? A multi-layered air defense system, various types of radars, highly skilled personnel, competent command and control, and effective situational awareness systems. That’s all technology, right? But Russia is using “Flamingo” cruise missiles, which are much easier targets than “Kalibrs” and X-101s. It’s a big “cow”—it’s large in size and should be clearly visible on radar. It can be taken down by any anti-aircraft missile system. But no.

Air defense is a real headache—when you’re short on air defense, it’s harder for the side with the larger territory to play the game. I don’t understand at all why they started this. Because the only thing we were lacking was resources. When they show up, you look at their map—and it’s all so tempting. You don’t know where to shoot. These idiots—there’s no other word for it—still don’t understand what’s going to happen. They think it’s a fluke, that it’ll somehow blow over, that it’ll just go away. They don’t see any connection between their own attitude of “we’re not interested in politics” and what’s coming down on their heads.  No matter what kind of government we have, it’s democratically elected. And it would never occur to the Ukrainian government to even think about going out to conquer someone else’s territory. Because if it ever opened its mouth and said that, there’d be a full-blown Maidan there. But in Russia, this idea has taken hold. And until they realize that their own lives depend on the choices they make, nothing will change. 

And when will they realize it?

I don’t know. But, from my point of view, if they don’t understand through words, then force is needed.

What do you think the enemy can bring to bear against southern Ukraine today?

Anything at all. We don’t know what they’re planning. We don’t know what’s in their plans. We don’t know what they’re stockpiling in their warehouses. I could share my own assumptions on the topic of “what I would do if I were in their shoes.” But I won’t go into that. Because, as it turns out, the enemy very often copies our decisions and thoughts without having any of their own. There’s a concept in psychology that says if a person doesn’t feel free, their creativity suffers greatly.

What threats from Russia do you consider the most dangerous for Ukraine?

The very existence of the Russian Federation. 

What is currently the biggest obstacle to the development and scaling up of Ukrainian military technology?

There’s a combination of factors. It’s very difficult to fix a car while it’s moving. Especially when it’s not on the road. There are a lot of people who know exactly how the military and the Ministry of Defense should be reformed. It’s easier to see things from the couch.

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Gennadiy Suldin. SCREENSHOT: Intent’s YouTube channel

First, there’s inertia. Because all the personnel within the system grew up, were trained, and gained extensive professional experience within this system. That’s how they live. Second, it’s precisely this kind of army that wins. Before criticizing, you need to know or understand at least something. Third, until recently, there was a huge professional gap between the troops and the leadership. It was a chasm. For some time now, I’ve seen that changes are taking place. We’re starting to hear this not only in the “United Marathon” report but also from brigade commanders who say, “Until I have this, nothing will happen.” They’ve started consulting with technicians and armormasters. It turns out that when the state funds development only in the public sector—but not in the private sector—for some reason, these innovations still appear in the private sector, raising two questions. The first, directed at state developers: “You were given money. Where are the results?” And the second: “If we fund private-sector development, what will we get in return?” The “Technari” team once shared our own vision with the general—what we believed we could achieve. Then we put it in writing. I won’t go into any further details.

There was a meeting once where the civilian developers from “Tekhnari” and military personnel were present. We debated, reached agreements, and exchanged information. After the meeting, I heard one of our military officers say, “If we can hold out like this for a year… the Russians don’t even realize what’s in store for them.” We can’t know what they have. They don’t know what we have.

Ольга Лопатюк