The New Cabinet and Zelenskyy's Old Problem

On July 17, 2025, Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented Yulia Svyrydenko’s government to the Verkhovna Rada. Without waiting a full week until the end of the government’s term, on July 12, 2026, the president announced a cabinet reshuffle. At the same time, we saw no public tension or mutual criticism between the president and the prime minister. A simple, human question arises: What happened?

Or is the right question: why now?

If not a complete replacement of the Cabinet, then major reshuffles within the government became evident following Andriy Yermak’s resignation. It is clear that the team led by Yulia Svyrydenko was, to a large extent, the result of his personnel decisions. With the dismissal of the head of Zelenskyy’s office, other figures in the President’s inner circle strengthened their positions; quite naturally, they sought to consolidate their influence within the government.

But the logical question—“Why now?”—remained unanswered. Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not speak of the government’s failure or the unsatisfactory performance of individual ministers. In other words, the President did not provide a clear and understandable explanation of the reason or the timing. This has given rise to speculation. I wouldn’t dismiss theories such as:

the resignation was the result of a conflict between Bankova and Shmyhal or between Bankova and Fedorov;
Western partners demanded the resignation;
the resignation is linked to the upcoming elections.

Following Andriy Yermak’s resignation, the cabinet reshuffle was dictated by Ukrainian political tradition. Perhaps it makes more sense to ask not “Why now?” but “Why did this become possible right now?”

And there are clear and unambiguous answers to that:

despite the difficult situation, the front is not experiencing a systemic shock, and in some areas, there are noticeable successes and grounds for optimism;
budget funding for the immediate future is secured;
negotiations on EU accession are ongoing;
the government has been in office long enough that we can speak of a technical necessity rather than the strengthening of certain political figures in connection with Yermak’s departure;
there is enough time to prepare for winter.

Before discussing new appointees with ministerial powers, a few words about the outgoing government.

The Legacy of the Svyrydenko Government

Zelenskyy presented the new prime minister to the Rada with a technical mandate: increasing the proportion of Ukrainian weapons in the hands of soldiers, a “policy of heroes,” deregulation, realistic social policy, digitalization, and negotiations with the EU.

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Yulia Svyrydenko. PHOTO: censor.net

RBC analyzed the cabinet’s nearly one year of work specifically in light of these tasks.

The most specific figure in last year’s presidential address to the Rada concerned weapons: at least 50% of Ukrainian weapons on the battlefield. As a result, according to government data—which no one disputes—the figure stands at 60%. The target was exceeded, and this is arguably the main structural shift of the year.

At the end of 2025, the opposition was talking everywhere about a default in 2026, and even government officials themselves acknowledged this prospect off the record. Today, those discussions have been forgotten:

$47.8 billion in foreign aid was secured over the past year;
a Ukraine Support Loan for 2026–2027 totaling 90 billion euros has been approved, of which 30 billion euros is budgetary support and 60 billion euros is for defense;
a new IMF program worth 8.1 billion euros has been launched.

The restructuring of GDP-linked bonds has yielded potential savings of up to 20 billion euros—a task that doesn’t make headlines but directly determines the country’s stability for years to come. For the first time since the start of the full-scale war, funding for the Armed Forces has been secured for two years in advance: 4.36 trillion hryvnia for defense and security in 2026 (42% of GDP), with 100% of budget revenues allocated to defense. In other words, the question of “How will we fight, and how will we pay public sector employees?” has been resolved for the next two years.

In July 2025, the President put it cautiously: Ukraine must be prepared across all negotiation clusters, and the outcome of the talks will depend “solely on the European Union’s ability to fulfill its promises.” A year later, Ukraine completed the screening process faster than any other country in the history of EU enlargement—according to the European Commission’s own assessment.

The winter of 2025–26 was the harshest of the entire war and the ultimate stress test of the government’s capabilities: over 500 attacks on the energy sector during the heating season, with forecasts of weeks-long blackouts and gas shortages. The system held up. The government’s contribution included scheduled repairs of 11.8 GW of capacity, the restoration of 4.2 GW, the construction of 269 protective structures, 10.3 billion cubic meters of gas in storage facilities (target: 14.6), and safeguards in place for next winter: diversification of supplies via LNG terminals in Klaipėda and Greece, and the Vertical Corridor providing 4.2 billion cubic meters per year.

Let’s start the list of downsides with state-owned companies. It was here that Svyrydenko was expected to bring about some of the fastest changes from the Cabinet of Ministers: the president explicitly demanded a reshuffle of supervisory boards and the restoration of order in corporate governance following the scandal surrounding Energoatom. The process has dragged on for months. Energoatom has become a symbol of the problem. The annual report mentions updated supervisory boards at major state-owned companies and an open competition for the CEO position, but publicly, there is a sense that order has still not been restored at the country’s largest energy company.

Second—investments. Work with investors lacked consistency—it was conducted more in response to major events than as a daily process.

Overall, the Svyrydenko government leaves behind a fairly solid legacy. It will be remembered as the government that removed the word “default” from the agenda and, for the first time since the war began, gave the state a two-year financial horizon; as the government under which Ukrainian weapons became the backbone of the front; and Ukraine underwent the fastest screening in the history of EU enlargement.

The Conflict Surrounding the Ministry of Defense

The Cabinet of Ministers is usually named after the prime minister. But in terms of the media and public outcry caused by the resignation, the outgoing Cabinet can safely be called Mykhailo Fedorov’s Cabinet.

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Mykhailo Fedorov. PHOTO: ms.detector.media

Mykhailo Fedorov, an entrepreneur, entered politics as the head of the digital division of presidential candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s 2019 election campaign. It must be acknowledged that it was precisely in this area that Zelenskyy secured an undisputed victory over Poroshenko. Deputy Prime Minister for Innovation, Education, Science, and Technology Development, and Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine in the governments of Oleksiy Honcharuk and Denys Shmyhal. On January 14, 2026, the Verkhovna Rada confirmed Mykhailo Fedorov as Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

Fedorov is undoubtedly one of the most successful managers on the current president’s team. He has succeeded in moving a significant portion of the state’s functions into the digital realm, and Zelenskyy has never been shy about touting the successes of digitalization.

On July 15, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that he had not yet decided whether Mykhailo Fedorov would become defense minister in the new Cabinet after Yulia Svyrydenko steps down. The Economist reported that Fedorov faced fierce resistance from the military leadership over his reforms, despite successes in developing drone technology and digitizing the army.

But conflict between the military command and the defense minister is not an anomaly; it is a natural part of the system. That is precisely why NATO standards stipulate that the defense minister must be a civilian and exercise civilian control over the armed forces. So what is the reason for Fedorov’s resignation: routine operational matters or Zelenskyy?

Fedorov’s tenure triggered a political crisis for the President. On July 16, mass rallies in support of the former minister took place in the capital and many other cities.

Among Mykhailo Fedorov’s indisputable achievements are his successes in the field of digitalization and his flagship project, “Diya.” He is also credited with strengthening the role of unmanned systems on the battlefield and recent successes related to drones —the explosions at oil refineries in the Russian Federation, which triggered a fuel crisis in the marshes and the blockade of Crimea.

When discussing Mykhailo Fedorov’s shortcomings, critics point to experts’ concerns regarding many aspects of the “Diya” initiative, as well as the fact that, in his six months as defense minister, he has yet to address the issue of the TCC. Human rights violations and unjustifiably harsh measures during the detention of Ukrainians have not ceased.

However, when discussing the reasons for Fedorov’s resignation, it hardly makes sense to mention the results of his work as defense minister. Six months is too short a period to draw conclusions. The author tends to agree with those observers who believe that the reason for Fedorov’s resignation is Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s somewhat unhealthy ego. The Office of the President constantly conducts public opinion polls, and, by all accounts, Fedorov’s rising approval ratings began to cause concern. But the attempt to eliminate a potential problem has, in fact, created it. For Mykhailo Fedorov, this is an excellent moment to launch an independent political career, which would be a major blow to Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In that case, he won’t be able to boast about the successes of digitalization.

To conclude this topic, it’s important to note one detail. The mass rallies in support of Mykhailo Fedorov clearly share a common organizational structure. Organizing rallies in many cities during the vacation and holiday season is no easy feat. The question of who organized this and what the ultimate goal is remains open. Perhaps the offers that Mykhailo Fedorov will receive if he leaves the President’s team will shed light on this.

Defense Without a Minister

Former Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko was drawn into the whirlwind of events surrounding the Ministry of Defense. He was the one named as Mykhailo Fedorov’s likely successor. When the situation surrounding Fedorov escalated, it became clear that, against this backdrop, Ihor Klymenko would not receive the necessary support from parliament.

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Ihor Klymenko. PHOTO: Ministry of Internal Affairs

It appears that to avoid a vote on his candidacy, Zelenskyy decided to remove him from the list of prospective ministers altogether. By all accounts, he will take the position of Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. In the Ukrainian context, this is supposedly a high-ranking position, but one without real authority or influence. It’s a sort of honorary spot on the bench, after which one either retires or moves on to something new.

For example, the current Secretary, Rustem Umerov, is rumored to be in line for the post of Ukraine’s ambassador to the U.S., a position that Yulia Svyrydenko turned down. Presumably, this would be a decent option for Umerov, given that he was caught on Mindich’s video recordings. It’s hard to say how much Igor Klymenko is pleased with his office at the National Security and Defense Council.

Amid the chaos surrounding the defense minister position, Volodymyr Zelenskyy found a compromise in the person of Major General Yevhen Khmara. From a political standpoint, this move is a success and may help ease tensions.

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Yevhen Khmara. PHOTO:novynarnia.com

Yevhen Khmara is an experienced special forces officer. Since 2011, he has served in the SBU’s Special Operations Center “A.” After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, he participated in the liberation of the Kyiv region and later fought in the Donetsk region. In 2022, Khmara led a special operation to liberate Zmiinyi Island. In 2023, he took command of the SBU’s elite “A” unit and was promoted to brigadier general. On June 23, 2024, he was promoted to major general. Starting January 5, 2026, he temporarily headed the Security Service of Ukraine following the resignation of Vasyl Malyuk.

Military expert Ivan Stupak describes the new acting Minister of Defense as a specialist with an in-depth understanding of military affairs from the inside. According to Igor Reiterovich, an associate professor at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Khmara’s main task will be to improve coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

That is true, but the Ministry of Defense is not only—and not primarily—a matter of military planning. The military department is, to a large extent, about multi-billion defense procurements. Whether Yevhen Khmara is sufficiently prepared for this area of activity remains to be seen.

Furthermore, under current law, the defense minister must be a civilian, which is why Khmara currently holds the position of acting minister. Experts believe that Khmara may resign from the military, which would remove the formal obstacles preventing his appointment. But the question remains: how will Ukraine’s partners react to the fact that the ministry will be led by someone who is unlikely to be open to democratic civilian control over the military?

The Syrsky Factor

The topic of the political storm that has erupted cannot be fully covered without mentioning the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Over the weekend, reports emerged about the Commander-in-Chief’s possible resignation. This move is clearly intended to shift the negative attention away from the President and onto someone else. Recall that it was Oleksandr Syrskyi who bore the brunt of the criticism during Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s resignation, so why not repeat this tactic?

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Oleksandr Syrskyi. PHOTO: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

However, the media initiative on this issue belongs not to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but to Mykhailo Fedorov. On July 16, during a briefing while discussing the eradication of crime, he stated: “We have no other choice if we want to defeat the enemy asymmetrically, with minimal losses, where strong leaders and commanders will develop and not be sidelined. A modern, technology-driven organization requires strong leadership. Radical personnel decisions have been proposed—replacing both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff.”

The issue of Oleksandr Syrskyi’s negative role was also taken up at the protests.

Replacing the commander-in-chief would appear to be a step by the president toward the protesters, but during the acute phase of the war, this is no simple task in and of itself. And given that Volodymyr Zelenskyy is very protective of influential figures who might overshadow him, the task becomes incredibly difficult.

Who Else Has Left

In the context of these changes, two other prominent figures are worth mentioning.

Oleksiy Kuleba—Deputy Prime Minister for Recovery and Minister of Community and Territorial Development. A Kyiv official with a municipal background—he served as Deputy Mayor under Klitschko, head of the Kyiv City State Administration’s Department of Public Works, and later as head of the Kyiv Regional State Administration. Since January 2023, he has served as Deputy Head of the Presidential Office for Regional Policy. His appointment in September 2024 was met with skepticism: Forbes noted even then that the new minister was “far removed from issues concerning Ukrzaliznytsia and the ports,” but “more relatable to mayors.”

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Oleksiy Kuleba. PHOTO:koda.gov.ua

To his credit, Kuleba can claim that he attempted to create a systematic framework for reconstruction. A comprehensive reconstruction system was established, ranging from strategic community planning to specific programs. This did not exist before Kuleba.

Kuleba’s ministry also launched a comprehensive reform of the construction sector, aimed at establishing transparent rules and digitizing processes.

Efforts were also made in the area of energy sustainability for communities.

But what is most remembered is the corruption scandal involving unjustified assets. On June 17, 2026, the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office filed a lawsuit with the High Anti-Corruption Court seeking to have assets totaling nearly 5 million hryvnias declared unjustified and to have them forfeited to the state. The High Anti-Corruption Court seized an apartment and a parking space in the Kyiv business-class residential complex “Shevchenkivskyi,” which, according to the declaration, were used by the Deputy Prime Minister.

It is also worth noting the lack of public communication regarding the results. Kuleba never became the public face of the recovery process, unlike Fedorov, for example.

Oksen Lisovyi is the Minister of Education and Science. He is an educator and public figure. He worked as a teacher at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, a fencing coach, and a manager at “Ukrtelecom.” In 2004, he became head of the Junior Academy of Sciences. He took office as minister in March 2023—directly from the front lines, where he had been serving as a volunteer.

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Oksen Lisovyi. PHOTO:ukrinform.ua

During his tenure, the education budget has increased. Despite a full-scale war and unprecedented pressure on public finances, the education budget rose from 156 billion UAH in 2023 to 278.7 billion UAH in 2026—an increase of 122.7 billion UAH, or nearly 79%. For a country simultaneously funding its defense forces, this was not an obvious decision.

Pay raises for educators. The 2026 state budget provides for a 30% pay raise for teachers, instructors, and academic staff effective January 1, and a 20% raise effective September 1. However, the plan to raise teachers’ salaries to three times the minimum wage in 2026 will not be implemented—the government has abandoned this provision, stating that there are no funds in the budget. In other words, Lisovyi’s key promise to teachers was only partially fulfilled.

Continuation of the New Ukrainian School (NUS) reform amid the war. During his three years in office, the minister accelerated the reforms of the New Ukrainian School and launched a pilot program for specialized high schools.

In the public sphere, a scandal erupted over the plagiarism in his dissertation for his Ph.D. degree. Separately, in December 2025, members of parliament registered a resolution calling for Lisovyi’s resignation, citing as grounds the alleged corruption schemes he had created during the reorganization of Uman State Pedagogical University, errors in the ministry’s financial reporting regarding an IBRD loan, and unjustified expenses during the printing of 8th-grade textbooks.

Lisovyi’s statement that the Ministry of Education and Science sees no anomalies in the student body drew attention. This was perceived as a reluctance to acknowledge the scale of the problem and take responsibility.

Whose government is this?

Governments are usually named after the prime minister. During Zelenskyy’s presidency, we have seen the governments of Goncharenko, Shmyhal, and Svyrydenko. But it is unlikely that, at the time of its appointment, the new government can be called the government of Serhiy Koretskyi. Let’s examine the new government in terms of who these people are and how they came to power.

The new prime minister is presented as someone with no experience in political battles, and the emphasis is placed on his managerial qualities. This clearly reflects Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s claim to the role of sole leader. And at this point, we can be certain that Serhiy Koretskyi did not take an active part in forming his cabinet but simply agreed to the proposed candidates. At the time, Koretsky was brought into power by Rostislav Shurma, the former deputy head of the President’s Office, and was supported by Andriy Yermak.

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Serhiy Koretskyi. PHOTO:Forbes Ukraine/Anton Zabel’skyi

Serhiy Koretskyi is a top executive and entrepreneur in the oil and gas industry. He served as CEO of the WOG gas station chain and headed Ukrnafta, UkrTatNafta, and Naftogaz. Key achievement: Under his leadership, Ukrnafta—which had incurred losses of over 10 billion hryvnias between 2013 and 2022—became one of the most successful state-owned companies. By the end of 2023–2024, the company had generated approximately 40 billion hryvnias in net profit.

If one were to describe Koretsky in a single sentence, he is a successful energy technocrat with no political experience, whom the system chose precisely because he does not engage in intrigue and conscientiously carries out his assignments— —the ideal figure for a government where the real levers of control are concentrated in the hands of others.

A few words about those who have retained their positions.

Denys Shmyhal. First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy since January 14, 2026. He has been a member of the government since February 4, 2020. He previously served as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Community and Territorial Development; from March 4, 2020, he served as Prime Minister; and from July 17, 2025, he served as Minister of Defense.

Serhiy Marchenko. Minister of Finance since March 30, 2020.

Viktor Lyashko. Minister of Health since May 20, 2021. Prior to that, he served as Deputy Minister from December 24, 2019, and as Deputy Minister and Chief State Sanitary Doctor from March 11, 2020.

Matvii Bidnyi. Minister of Youth and Sports since September 5, 2024. Prior to that, he served as Deputy Minister from July 15, 2020, and as Acting Minister from November 9, 2023.

Denis Ulyutin. Minister of Social Policy, Family, and Unity since July 17, 2025. Prior to that, he served as First Deputy Minister of Finance under Serhiy Marchenko from April 4, 2020.

Tetyana Berezhna. Deputy Prime Minister for Humanitarian Policy—Minister of Culture since October 21, 2025. She is a close associate of Yulia Svyrydenko. From June 17, 2022, she served as Svyrydenko’s deputy in the position of Minister of Economy, and from July 28, 2025, she served as acting Minister of Culture and Strategic Communications.

The leader of the “Servant of the People” faction, Davyd Arakhamia, is considered the chief architect of the new government. The following politicians can safely be counted among Arakhamia’s allies.

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David Arakhamia. PHOTO:sluga-narodu.com

Vitaliy Kim—Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. The former head of the Mykolaiv Regional State Administration, who became a national hero thanks to his ironic addresses during the defense of Mykolaiv in 2022. His appointment to the relatively minor veterans’ portfolio appears to be a gesture by Arakhamia toward the Mykolaiv electorate rather than a reflection of the politician’s true stature.

Vitaliy Bezgin – Minister of Communities, Territories, and IDPs. He, along with Kharkiv Mayor Igor Terekhov, is considered close to Arakhamia. A hypothetical “Terekhov–Kim Party” regularly appears in opinion polls, sometimes even garnering more than 5%. In other words, Bezgin is part of the same “Kharkiv-Mykolaiv” cluster around Arakhamia as Kim.

Denis Maslov is the Minister of Justice. Maslov was a member of parliament from the “Servant of the People” party (No. 138 on the list) and chaired the Committee on Legal Policy. He is a classic “faction” candidate—someone whom Arakhamia, as faction leader, personally knows and controls through the parliamentary committee. But observers note that the Ministry of Justice is filled with people loyal to another key figure in the Office of the President—Oleg Tatarov.

It can be stated that the new Cabinet is, in fact, a government of two centers of influence: Zelenskyy sets the strategic direction, while Arakhamia shapes the personnel lineup. Kirill Budanov emerges as a third force vying for his own representation. However, it should be noted that while analysts speak of Budanov’s influence as a trend, specific “Budanov people” in the government are not publicly identified as clearly as “Arakhamia’s people.” Yermak has almost no influence. The legacy of his influence was eliminated along with the Svyrydenko government, and those who remained from the previous cabinet have likely already taken a new oath of allegiance.

What the future holds for us

The political storm surrounding the change in government is raging and will undoubtedly have significant consequences. The Office of the President chose the moment very wisely, as there are many positive signs on the front lines and in the economy, the EU accession process is moving forward successfully, and positive signals are coming from the U.S. At the same time, however, Zelenskyy’s team botched the government reshuffle and faced what is arguably the most serious political crisis of its time in office.

This situation was not the result of a single mistake by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but rather the outcome of a systematic effort to create the image of the sole victor in the war and the most flawless leader, one who cannot be criticized. The president is extremely sensitive to charismatic, positive figures holding high-profile positions in Ukraine. And while the maneuver involving Valeriy Zaluzhny’s resignation went off with minimal damage, the move involving Mykhailo Fedorov’s resignation turned out to be a complete failure for the incumbent president. Yet another attempt to cement his fabricated status as the sole ruler of the state has failed spectacularly. Ukrainians have once again demonstrated that when the system of checks and balances in a parliamentary-presidential republic fails, the people take to the streets.

The new prime minister was chosen based on the criterion of “as long as he doesn’t overshadow Zelenskyy.” As a result, a politically inexperienced manager who had never formed his own cabinet was invited to take the political post. Now Serhiy Koretsky will have to quickly familiarize himself not only with his new range of responsibilities but also learn the ropes of political compromise with the Office of the President, ministers, and their backers. For the head of the Cabinet of Ministers in a country at war, this is a very complex and difficult task. All that remains is to wish him success.

Ігор Льов

Zelenskyy's Personnel Shuffle: How a Cabinet Reshuffle Led to a Political Crisis