May 20, 2024, 9:51 p.m.
(Photo: Cliff Volpe/Contributor/Getty Images)
In August 2008, a short but fierce clash took place between Russia and Georgia, which went down in history as the Five-Day War. Let's try to understand what events led to the outbreak of hostilities and why the Georgian experience is interesting for Ukraine in this article.
Some information about the territory of historical Georgia
The end of the USSR and the path to sovereignty
The heyday of the Georgian kingdom was in the XI-XIII centuries. Later, the state fell victim to the Mongol-Tatar invasion. Later, the Ottoman Empire became the dominant power in the Transcaucasus. The collapse of the Georgian kingdom in the fifteenth century led to the separation of the Abkhaz principality. In the following centuries, Georgia and Abkhazia tried to establish contact with Orthodox Russia, which they saw as a counterweight to Ottoman influence. Beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire began to look more closely at the Transcaucasus. In particular, it used Georgia in its struggle against the Ottoman Empire and Persia. In the nineteenth century, Russia began to absorb the territory of the former Georgian kingdom. In 1801, eastern Georgia was annexed, and in 1810, the Abkhaz principality joined the Russian Empire, even retaining its autonomy until 1864.
Ossetians historically lived in the North Caucasus, which is now part of Russia. They lived in a closed mountainous area in a rural patriarchal system. Due to the lack of land for farming, Ossetians later began to settle in the south, where Georgia is now located. In 1774, North Ossetia became part of the Russian Empire. In 1801, the Georgian principality of Kartli-Kakheti, which included most of modern-day South Ossetia, also became part of the empire. During this period, Georgians and Ossetians had difficult relations due to regular armed raids by the latter. Russian authorities even organized punitive military expeditions to resolve the South Ossetian issue.
After the February 1917 revolution, the region began to ferment. In particular, the following year, the Georgian Democratic Republic, which included the territories of modern-day Abkhazia and South Ossetia, declared independence. Both Abkhazians and Ossetians claimed self-determination. With the support of Russia, in 1918-20, Ossetians organized three uprisings under the slogans of proclaiming Soviet power. In 1921, the Soviet army invades Georgia. The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was formed within the Georgian SSR. Interestingly, at this time the Abkhazian SSR was also formed, which, along with other republics, participated in the creation of the USSR. In 1922, the Abkhaz SSR, together with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, became part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (TSFSR). It was only in 1931 that Abkhazia became an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR.
Image: Wikipedia
In the late 1980s, when the USSR was living out its last days, ideas of national revival were intensifying. The movement for independence was actively developing in Georgia, but South Ossetia and Abkhazia were also trying to use this wave to seize the chance for self-determination. In September 1990, the deputies of South Ossetia proclaimed it a republic within the USSR. However, Georgia reacted negatively to the Ossetians' attempts at self-determination. In response, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia abolishes the region's autonomy, thus demonstrating that South Ossetia is an integral part of the republic. In January 1991, the war between Georgia and South Ossetia begins, actively supported by Russia. Georgia declares independence in April 1991, but under Russian pressure is forced to sign a ceasefire agreement in 1992. One third of the former autonomous region became the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia with its capital in Tskhinvali, and peacekeepers were deployed on its territory.
Georgia's relations with Abkhazia, which also declared itself an independent republic of the USSR in 1990, were also difficult. In an attempt to keep Abkhazia, Georgia decided to invalidate the USSR Constitution and return to the 1921 Constitution of the Georgian SSR, i.e., the period before the creation of the USSR, but with Abkhazia as part of Georgia. In response, Abkhazia proposes to return to the USSR Constitution of 1925, in which Abkhazia had the same status as Georgia in the RSFSR. The 1992-93 war, in which Russia actively supported the separatists, ended in defeat for Georgia. It lost the entire territory of Abkhazia, except for the Kodori Gorge. Like South Ossetia, Abkhazia also became a self-proclaimed republic.
In 2000, with Putin's rise to power, relations between Russia and Georgia deteriorated, and Russia began to distribute Russian passports to anyone in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ukraine will face the same tactics ten years later. In this way, Russia was, firstly, preparing a springboard for the possible annexation of the territories and, secondly, creating an environment to come to the aid of the "new Russians" in case of escalation.
In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in Georgia and set a course for European integration, NATO membership, and the return of unrecognized territories. The president is supported by the United States. Saakashvili begins to reform and rearm the army. Compared to 2003, Georgia's military budget grew more than 30 times in 2007, amounting to 8% of GDP.
Tbilisi, May 2005. Photo: Photo.
In 2006, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili said that he wanted to celebrate the new year 2007 in the capital of South Ossetia and promised to resign if this did not happen. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov responded by promising military assistance to both unrecognized republics if Georgia were to engage in conflict. During 2004-07, there were clashes on the borders with the unrecognized territories, and the parties accused each other. Tensions gradually increased.
Since the beginning of 2008, Georgian drones have been flying over the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia more frequently. Some of the drones were shot down. The Georgian president claimed that the drones were shot down by the Russian air force, but Russia refused to admit this.
In early April, the NATO summit takes place in Bucharest, where the issue of Georgia and Ukraine's membership in the organization is discussed. Already during the summit, Putin aggressively opposes it and even hints that if Ukraine joins NATO, Russia may invade Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Moscow is also irritated by the discussion of recognizing Kosovo's independence from Serbia, which was proclaimed in February against Russia's interests.
In the spring, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructs the government to begin active cooperation with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which effectively means recognizing both territories. In April, some units of the 7th Guards Airborne Division of the Russian Federation went to Abkhazia and deployed to the Georgian border as peacekeeping forces. At the same time, the number of Russians did not exceed 3,000 people, which was in line with the terms of the agreement signed in the 1990s. At that time, South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity said that Georgian regular troops were being brought to the borders of his republic. At the end of May, Russian railway troops were deployed to Abkhazia to repair railroad tracks, and Russia emphasized that the troops were not armed. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its belief that the repair of railroad tracks is carried out only in preparation for military operations.
In early July, the Georgian and Ossetian authorities began accusing each other of shelling border villages. Ossetians even talked about shelling Tskhinvali. On July 11, the Georgian ambassador was recalled from Moscow after Russia admitted that its military aircraft were flying over the unrecognized republics. In the second half of July, joint Georgian-American "Instant Response" exercises were held near Tbilisi, and Russian "Caucasus 2008" exercises were held in the North Caucasus. Since the beginning of August, mutual exchanges of fire have been taking place daily. Women, children, and the elderly begin to be taken from South Ossetia to Russia.
On August 7, Mikheil Saakashvili announced that he had ordered Georgian forces in the conflict zone not to respond to shooting from South Ossetia. In the evening of the same day, Ossetians began shelling Georgian villages located on the territory of the unrecognized republic. Around midnight, Georgia began massive shelling of Tskhinvali with Grad rockets and howitzers. At about 1 a.m., Georgia announces the start of hostilities, and troops move toward Tskhinvali.
A Georgian T-72 tank destroyed in Tskhinvali. Photo: Wikipedia
Even now, the moment of the war's outbreak causes many controversial statements. The Georgian leadership of the time repeatedly claimed that it had launched hostilities in response to the facts that Russian troops had entered South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel on August 7. The Georgian side later released a recording of a telephone conversation between allegedly South Ossetian border guards discussing the necessary actions after the arrival of Russian troops. Even if the recording is genuine and not deliberate Russian disinformation, it does not allow us to answer many key questions in this case. It seems clear to us that Russian troops were waiting in full combat readiness in the area of the Roki tunnel for orders. It is also clear that the volunteers from North Ossetia were on the territory of the unrecognized republic in advance. It is even possible that some Russian units may have crossed the border before the Georgian declaration of war. The question is what can be irrefutably proven in this case and whether the crossing of individual Russian units through the Roki tunnel is sufficient grounds for a full-scale war. In any case, the International Commission of Inquiry on the War in the South Caucasus, established by the European Union, came to an unequivocal conclusion: Georgia was the first to start hostilities. In addition, the Commission found insufficient evidence of the invasion of significant Russian forces into South Ossetia before August 8. At the same time, the Commission accused Moscow of provoking the conflict.
A convoy of Russian vehicles moving from the Roki tunnel to Georgia. Photo: AP/SCANPIX
During the Georgian offensive, one of the bases of Russian peacekeepers was shelled. Some people pay too much attention to this fact and argue that it was because of this circumstance that Russia was forced to enter the conflict. However, the subsequent hostilities irrefutably show that Russia was fully prepared for the war and its participation cannot be attributed to coincidence.
In the morning, Georgia offers Russia to act as a peacekeeper in the conflict. And Russia, of course, agrees, but in its own way. During the night, two tactical groups of the 58th Army of the Russian Federation began to move through the Roki tunnel. According to the book Tanks of August, the group has always been deployed on the border of South Ossetia during escalations in the region. According to the source, the total number of both groups reached about 1500 people and included military equipment.
In the morning, the fighting for Tskhinvali continues, and columns of the Russian 58th Army are moving through the Roki tunnel. Mikheil Saakashvili announces general mobilization. Georgian aviation shells Tskhinvali, and Russian aviation shells targets in Georgia and South Ossetia. In the middle of the day on August 8, the Russian Defense Ministry officially announces that reinforcements have been sent to South Ossetia. In the afternoon, Russian tank columns surround Tskhinvali and begin shelling Georgian positions.
On August 9, the Russian Navy enters Georgian waters for patrols. A naval landing begins in Abkhazia. August 10 Georgian troops leave Tskhinvali. The Russian fleet occupies the main Georgian port of Poti. In the evening, Russian ships fire on Georgian boats that were moving in the area.
A Georgian boat sunk in the port of Poti. Photo: Wikipedia
On August 11, Georgian troops completely left the territory of South Ossetia. The Russian army crosses the Georgian border from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The occupiers declare full control over the airspace, Russia captures Gori, approaches Zugdidi and Senaki. Georgian troops retreat along the entire front to Tbilisi. Mikheil Saakashvili declares that the capital is ready for defense. On August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev declares the end of active hostilities. French President Nicolas Sarkozy urgently flies to Moscow to resolve the conflict.
According to the signed agreement on the settlement of the conflict, Russian troops had to leave the territory of Georgia and return to the positions they held before the war. This point was only partially fulfilled: the occupiers left the territory of Georgia, but settled on the territory of the unrecognized republics. On August 26, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which means that since then, with their permission, it can deploy its troops in these territories. In addition to Russia, Venezuela, Nauru, Nicaragua, and Syria have also recognized the independence of the republics.
An occupation tank in Tskhinvali on August 20, 2008. Photo: picture-alliance/epa/M. Shipenkov
According to Russian sources, the number of Russian military killed in the conflict ranged from 48 to 74 people. Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin estimated the number of dead South Ossetians at 162. However, sometimes this figure reaches 2000 people. According to official Georgian data, 179 Georgian servicemen were killed or went missing in the war. Up to 30,000 Georgians were forced to leave their homes in South Ossetia and were unable to return.
The defeat in the Five-Day War significantly complicated Georgia's chances of annexing South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Diplomatic relations between the two sides of the conflict are virtually nonexistent.
The war also dealt a blow to Mikheil Saakashvili's authority. His party lost the next parliamentary elections. The president himself fled the country, just before the end of his second term. Later, criminal proceedings were opened against him.
Provocation is one of Russia's favorite ways to interact in international relations. The war with Georgia was a vivid example of this. In our opinion, the process of deliberate provocation of Georgia began in the spring of 2008 after Georgia expressed its ambitions to join NATO. The overconfident neighbor had to be shown its place. In addition, using Georgia as an example, Russia could take revenge on the West for recognizing Kosovo's independence.
Obviously, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made a grave mistake when he started the conflict. In international relations, an aggressor country can never count on support for its actions. In the eyes of the international community, Georgia was the aggressor. The President of Georgia was let down by his ambitions, as at the beginning of his first term he proclaimed his goal to return the lost territories. Reforming the army according to NATO models and support from the West gave him confidence that the blitzkrieg and subsequent conclusion of a peace agreement with the help of the allies could lead to the realization of the goal. Figuratively speaking, both chess players were taking a certain position, considering it favorable for themselves. However, the Russian chess player assessed it more accurately.
Could Russia have invaded Georgia? Physically, it was capable of doing so. At the time of the agreement, the Georgian army was demoralized by the developments at the front. Another thing is that the storming and destruction of the major city of Tbilisi would have had a significant global impact. This could have turned Russia from a "peacekeeper" to an aggressor in the eyes of the international community, leading to sanctions and complications in international relations. At that time, Russia was not ready for this. It was taking notes and drawing conclusions. It is very good that Ukraine has also drawn some conclusions from this conflict. In particular, at the time of the Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine did not respond to Russian provocations in the occupied Crimea. Given the state of the Ukrainian army at the beginning of the conflict, the consequences could have been dire. Ukraine also managed not to respond to Russian provocations in 2022, when Russia had to face the world community in its true form as an aggressor country.
Speaking about the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, it is important to address such a complex topic as the right of peoples to self-determination. Hardly anyone in the world knows how to deal with such issues "properly." Almost all major European countries now have centers of separatism that want to separate from the center. And it is quite clear that in no case does the central government want to give up part of its own territory. However, the author believes that during the collapse of the USSR, it would be fair to give self-determination to all peoples who had been under imperial subjugation for decades. Otherwise, small peoples were in transit from one enslavement to another. I believe that Georgia's actions in relation to South Ossetia and Abkhazia were far from ideal. Another thing is that in each case, small nations were helped by such an "outstanding peacemaker" as Russia. Over the long centuries of domination, the empire has learned well the principle of "divide and conquer," pitting one national idea against another, mixing and assimilating representatives of different nations at the regional level. It seems that this trend will continue as long as Russia remains on the world map.
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