Will Russia Be Able to Block the Black Sea Again?

Recently, there has been an increase in attacks on civilian merchant ships by the aggressor country. It appears that, in response to Ukraine’s energy sanctions against Russian oil refineries and other oil facilities, the aggressor country has decided to send a signal from the swamps about the resumption of the blockade of Black Sea ports.

Specifically, on June 10, the Russians used strike drones in the Black Sea to attack two dry cargo ships flying the flags of Barbados and Panama that were traveling through the maritime corridor. Another attack took place on June 19. One crew member was killed, and two sailors were wounded.

A Brief History of the Blockade

During the operation of the grain corridor (August 1, 2022 – July 17, 2023), despite constant Russian threats, there were few serious confirmed cases of attacks on merchant ships directly within the framework of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In fact, the main targets were port terminals, grain silos, and infrastructure, rather than the ships themselves. Therefore, it can be said that during the grain agreement, there were no widespread attacks on the merchant fleet.

After the grain agreement ended (on July 18, 2023), the situation changed. In the second half of 2023, damage to at least two ships flying the flags of Liberia and Panama was confirmed. Up to 15 ships were damaged in 2024. The attacks continued in 2025. According to statements by the Ukrainian side, by mid-2025, the number of damaged merchant ships had exceeded two dozen.

It is important to note here that relatively reliable official data is available for Ukrainian ports (Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority, Ministry of Development). However, when it comes to the maritime corridor, information must be sought in reports from shipping agencies and insurance companies, which makes accurate tracking difficult.

Key Elements of the Naval Blockade

Let’s list the ways in which Russia has attempted to block the movement of ships.

1. Preemptive restrictions on shipping. As early as mid-February 2022, on the eve of the invasion, Russia, under the pretext of military exercises, restricted shipping in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, imposing a de facto naval blockade even before the official start of the war.
2. Declaration of a terrorist threat zone. Shortly after the invasion began, Muscovy completely closed off this part of the Black Sea, stating that any vessels in the area, including commercial ones, were considered a terrorist threat.
3. Mining of the waters. The occupying army mined part of the maritime area, making safe navigation to Ukrainian ports more difficult. This has led to higher costs for international insurance and prompted international shipowners to reconsider their future cooperation. According to the OSCE, Russian occupiers have laid additional sea mines in the approaches to Ukrainian ports to sink civilian vessels.
4. Detention and inspection of vessels. After the Russian Federation unilaterally canceled the grain corridor in July 2023, it made a series of high-profile statements claiming that foreign merchant vessels would be treated as potential carriers of military cargo. The Black Sea Fleet was tasked with monitoring “arms shipments” and would stop merchant ships for inspection. These inspections were consistently delayed in order to reduce the number of ship calls at Ukrainian ports.
5. Missile and drone strikes on port infrastructure. At the same time, Russia concentrated its missile attacks on the port infrastructure of Odesa and the Odesa region. The occupiers attacked Ukrainian ports with drones and missiles almost daily.

What Port Cargo Throughput Reveals

Below is a table illustrating cargo throughput at ports in the Odesa region over the past five years (in millions of metric tons).

Clearly, current cargo turnover at ports in the Odesa region falls short of 2021 levels. On the other hand, it is worth noting that after Russia terminated the grain deal and increased pressure, cargo turnover actually increased significantly. We emphasize that the figures provided refer only to ports in the Odesa region. We must not forget that Ukraine has lost cargo throughput at the ports on the Sea of Azov, as well as those in Mykolaiv and Kherson. This demonstrates that Ukraine remains a major player in global food security, despite Russian sabotage. Despite the increase in attacks on foreign vessels, they are willing to take on the additional risk. We can conclude that attempts at a Russian blockade following the suspension of the grain corridor have so far failed.

Is there a risk of a new blockade?

On June 23, Ihor Lutsenko published an article titled “Can Russia Blockade Ukraine from the Sea Again?” Following the June attacks on civilian vessels, the military officer points out that Russia has been experimenting with weapons at sea near the Ukrainian coast for some time now, and concludes that it is time to consider maritime anti-drone security.

You don’t have to be a great analyst to conclude that Ukrainian soldiers were able to virtually completely neutralize all elements of the 2022 naval blockade. The Black Sea Fleet has long since ceased to be a fleet, consisting now of only a few ships trapped in their ports. Mine-clearing operations have also been successfully carried out. Of the aggressor’s entire arsenal, only missiles and drones remain. But even with those, it’s not that simple. Missiles are an expensive proposition even for the henchmen of the “bunker grandpa,” and dealing with drone attacks at sea will be difficult given the energy blockade—and other restrictions— on Crimea. After all, drones don’t fly on their own; they must be transported to a launch site and refueled.

Nevertheless, one cannot help but agree with Ihor Lutsenko’s conclusion that we should have started thinking yesterday about the security of the airspace over the sea, which is more difficult to ensure than over land.

Therefore, the Muscovites can only dream of reinstating the naval blockade. Thanks to the Ukrainian defense forces, the military situation has changed dramatically. However, we cannot afford to let our guard down—the Russians still have their dreams. 

Ігор Льов