March 11, 2024, 7:55 a.m.
(Photo: UP with reference to M. Koval)
More than 20 years have passed since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict over the island of Tuzla. From the vantage point of historical experience, the events of that time are perceived as a prophecy of the future war. The Intent offers to look at those events again, analyze the facts and make some generalizations.
An island that has not always been an island
The legal status of Tuzla and Russian claims
Leonid Kuchma and the situation before the conflict
How to turn an island into a peninsula
Tuzla Island is located in the Kerch Strait between the Ukrainian Crimea and the Russian Krasnodar Territory. The distance to the island from the mainland is short: 4 km from the Ukrainian side and 5 km from the Russian side. Tuzla covers an area of 3.5 square kilometers and is only 500 meters wide. The island is covered by a steppe landscape. In 2003, Tuzla was home to a few dozen people, mostly engaged in fishing and farming.
The Kerch Strait on the eve of the conflict. Photo: Wikipedia
Some scholars note that several thousand years ago, there was a large plot of land on the site of modern Tuzla that geographically belonged to the Taman Peninsula. In the last millennium, geographical maps showed the Tuzla Spit, which was divided into several islands and then reunited with the Taman Peninsula. Interestingly, after the defeat in the Crimean War, the Russian Empire decided to block the Kerch Strait so that ships were forced to pass through the area of coastal batteries. As a result of these operations, the Middle Spit approached the Crimean coast to a distance of 900 meters, but in the early twentieth century, the reclaimed part of the island was destroyed by storms. The final severance of the Tuzla Spit and its transformation into an island in its present form took place in 1925.
In 1941, Tuzla was transferred to the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and in 1954, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic became part of the Ukrainian SSR. Of course, the borders within the USSR were a formality, but Tuzla's legal affiliation with the Ukrainian SSR cannot be questioned. In November 1990, Leonid Kravchuk of the Ukrainian SSR and Boris Yeltsin of the Russian SSR signed a treaty in which Article 6 obliged the parties to respect each other's territorial integrity within the borders of the then existing borders. Interestingly, two days after Ukraine declared its independence in 1991, Yeltsin's press secretary Pavel Voshchanov emphasized that in the event of termination of allied relations between the USSR republics, the Russian Federation reserved the right to raise the issue of revising the borders. As Voschanov himself later admitted, the statement was made on behalf of the Russian president. It was important for Yeltsin to preserve the image of a democratic politician, so he shifted the unpleasant job to his subordinate. In 1997, the so-called "Great Treaty" was signed between independent Russia and Ukraine, which again recognized the inviolability of existing borders and respect for territorial integrity. Since the parties had reaffirmed their intentions twice, any territorial conflicts were supposed to end, but they were only just beginning.
Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma during the signing of the "Great Agreement"
In the same year, 1997, lawyer and member of the Krasnodar Territory Legislative Assembly Alexander Travnikov published two books in which he emphasized the strategic importance of returning Tuzla to Russian rule. In 2002, he formed a regional deputy committee to return the island to Russian jurisdiction. Within a year, the committee members send letters to Putin demanding the return of the island, and if necessary, offer to land a military assault near Kerch. Interestingly, in January 2003, the Treaty on the Ukrainian-Russian State Border was signed, although it was not ratified until April 2004, after the conflict had ended. This fact demonstrates how cynically Putin was able to manipulate various agreements at the beginning of his presidency.
If we talk about the meaningful territorial claims that have been formed at the turn of the century in the minds of Russian "intellectuals," they can be summarized as follows: Russia cannot recognize the Ukrainian island of Tuzla because such an island does not exist. First, there was the Taman Peninsula, then the Tuzla Spit appeared, which was naturally tied to the Krasnodar Territory, so it should historically belong to Russia. Of course, this logic must be shattered by the above facts: Khrushchev transferred the territory of Crimea with Tuzla to the Ukrainian SSR, and Russia twice documented this without coercion.
The Kerch Strait is a strategically important passage from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov. The island of Tuzla divides the strait into two parts - Russian and Ukrainian. The Ukrainian part, the Kerch-Yenikalsky Canal, is navigable, while the Russian part is not.
Researchers give various reasons why the capture of Tuzla could have been important to the Russians. The argument is always made that Ukraine collected tolls from ships passing through the canal. So by capturing Tuzla, Russia could avoid paying Ukraine and even take control of the traffic. This argument seems insignificant, because, according to various sources, the annual traffic at that time was estimated at between six million dollars and several dozen. Given Russia's GDP, such an amount could hardly be a sufficient reason to start an international conflict.
Another reason for the seizure of the island is the oil and gas fields that were allegedly discovered near Tuzla on the eve of the conflict. Here, the potential profits are estimated to be much higher, but it is difficult to think of two other natural resources that Russia would be less interested in accessing.
The third reason is that Ukraine had the ability to decide solely which ships to allow into the Azov Sea. In this case, the situation is much more serious. The fact is that one of Russia's worst fears after the collapse of the USSR was the penetration of NATO troops into Ukraine. By the way, leading geopoliticians at the end of the 20th century also declared Ukraine a battleground between Russia and the Western coalition. Therefore, the very possibility of unimpeded penetration of NATO ships into the Sea of Azov had to be brought under control by Russia.
Finally, another reason is Putin and his imperial plans. The Kremlin leader has never concealed that he aims to revive the USSR. To do so, he needed to tie the former republics to Russia economically and, if possible, to take away territories. In particular, in 2002, Russia took away the islands of Ukatny and Zhirzhky from Kazakhstan in the Caspian Sea, which seems to hint at further events in Ukraine. It is likely that the decision to create a Russian-Ukrainian conflict stemmed from a complex of reasons.
Leonid Kuchma and the situation before the conflict
Leonid Kuchma is probably one of the most complex figures in Ukrainian politics since independence. Some experts call him the best Ukrainian president. However, they add that the sample is not very representative. Leonid Kuchma came to power with ideas of Ukrainian-Russian friendship. Russian politicians and Russian television actively supported his candidacy during the election. After the election victories of Kuchma and Lukashenko in Belarus, the Moscow newspaper Zavtra (Tomorrow) ran the headline"Ours". However, Kuchma was not going to surrender Ukraine, preferring active maneuvering and flirting with the West about joining the EU and NATO in the future.
In the fall of 2000, Leonid Kuchma was suspected of first disappearing and then ordering the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze. A little later, the "chainmail scandal" began, related to Ukraine's alleged supply of military equipment to sanctioned Iraq. Both events had a significant impact on the complication of relations between Ukraine and the collective West. The Ukrainian president tried to remedy the situation by sending the third largest peacekeeping contingent to Iraq after the United States and Britain. As relations with the West deteriorated, Kuchma took another step toward Moscow. The year 2002 was declared the year of Ukraine in Russia, and 2003 the year of Russia in Ukraine. On September 19, 2003, in Yalta, the heads of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine signed an agreement on the creation of a common economic space. Interestingly, it was during this period that Leonid Kuchma considered running for president for the third time, which contradicts the Ukrainian Constitution. The fact that the Constitutional Court of Ukraine allowed Kuchma to run for office once again proves that the president had Napoleonic plans.
At the beginning of September 2003, Kuchma published a book "Ukraine is not Russia", which was first published in Moscow in Russian and only later translated into Ukrainian. There are a number of versions of why this book was needed. I think it should be interpreted in the context of Kuchma's maneuvering strategy. On the one hand, the title of the book had a poster character and could demonstrate the patriotism of the Ukrainian leader on the eve of the elections. On the other hand, the author himself repeatedly emphasizes in the book that Ukraine and Russia should definitely maintain friendly relations.
Leonid Kuchma at the presentation of the book "Ukraine is not Russia" in Moscow. Photo: SERGEI CHIRIKOV
In mid-September 2003, Putin said that Russia should have more rights in the Sea of Azov. A few days later, the administration of the Krasnodar region decided to build a dam in the Kerch Strait. On September 27, two Russian journalists arrive in Tuzla and ask the locals for their opinion on joining Russia. Two days after the journalists arrive, construction of the dam begins. The governor of the Krasnodar Territory , Alexander Tkachev , explains the start of the work by saying that the coast of the Taman Peninsula is slipping into the sea and needs support. However, it quickly becomes apparent that the Russians are washing the spit toward Tuzla. Residents of Tuzla report this to the border guards. The General of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine, Mykhailo Koval, tries to explain the danger of the situation to the head of the Presidential Administration, Viktor Medvedchuk, but he hangs up on him. Then the general decided to send border guards to unprotected Tuzla to prepare for a possible Russian attack. As M. Koval explained, if only the border guards had taken the fight, the conflict could have remained at the level of a local clash and not escalated into an international one.
Ukrainian border guards on the island of Tuzla preparing for a Russian attack. Photo: Andriy Kanyshchev
On October 6, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko met in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, who assured him that Russia was not going to violate Ukraine's border. At that time, the Russians had launched "production" and the dam was approaching Tuzla at a rate of 150 meters per day. Ukrainian ships and helicopters appeared in the Kerch Strait to demonstrate to the Russians that they were serious. Regular units on the Kerch coast are preparing to support border guards if events reach a hot phase.
The spit is being washed in the direction of Tuzla. Photo: UP provided by M. Koval
Interestingly, the head of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service, Mykola Lytvyn, has not been involved in decision-making all this time. When the border guards at Tuzla disguised two armored transporters as tanks, Mr. Lytvyn expressed concern that the conflict could go beyond a border clash. According to M. Koval, on October 10, he received a phone call from M. Lytvyn and was given a verbal order to withdraw border guards from the island. The general replied: "Mykola Mykhailovych, you are a pacifist. If there is a written order, I will fulfill it. If there is not, I will not fulfill it."
On October 19, Putin said that Russia "reserves the right to launch preemptive strikes in case the principle of using force without the sanction of the international community prevails in the world." In incomprehensible dictatorial language, this can be translated as follows: if Russian "builders" think that Ukrainian border guards are ready to use weapons, they reserve the right to attack first. At that time, Ukrainians already knew that regular Russian troops were ready to engage on the Taman coast.
On October 20, Kuchma leaves for a visit to South America, which in the context of the above seems simply incredible.
Kuchma himself cites a number of arguments in favor of why he did not cancel the visit. First, the visit was important and had long been agreed upon. Secondly, the construction was progressing sluggishly at the time and allegedly even stopped at some point. Thirdly, Putin personally assured him that the whole thing was an act of amateurishness by the Krasnodar governor, which the Russian dictator did not even know about, but would definitely look into.
Upon learning of the Ukrainian president's departure, the Russians suddenly intensified their work, and the dam was growing at a rate of 5-6 meters per hour. In response, the Ukrainians find two barges, each 38 meters long, tie them together, and place them in the path of the Russian dam. The barges are manned by cadets from the Ukrainian Border Guard Academy.
The Ukrainians are trying to block the dam's progress with the barges. Photo: UP, provided by M. Koval
On October 22, events intensified. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine holds hearings on Ukrainian-Russian relations. At the same time, a pro-Russian rally takes place in Simferopol in front of the Crimean parliament building, with participants declaring their readiness to hand over not only Tuzla but the entire Crimea to Russia. Kuchma concludes talks with the Brazilian president and finally heads to Tuzla.
On October 23, in the morning, Kuchma arrived at Tuzla. He looked through binoculars at the dam, inspected the defensive positions of the border guards, checked the strength of the border pillar, and called Putin. In the afternoon, Kuchma officially announced that he had agreed with Putin to stop the construction of the dam. At that time, there were about 100 meters between the dam and the island.
Leonid Kuchma from Tuzla inspects the Russian dam. Photo: UP provided by M. Koval
Kuchma did a lot to later heroize his participation in the conflict. In particular, a popular story is how Kuchma "turned the plane around" and flew to South America. This is only possible if the President of Brazil arrived at Kuchma's plane and held talks with him on the flight. Recalling his return from a business trip to South America, Leonid Kuchma said: "I think that if I had stayed even a day longer, we would have lost Tuzla." Finally, Kuchma likes to recall how he spoke on Putin's phone on Tuzla and warned the Russian leader that he had given the order to shoot if necessary.
However, it seems more likely that he was gently hinting at the possibility of an armed confrontation, and that Putin allegedly agreed with the Ukrainian president's arguments.
The Kerch Strait after the construction of the dam. Photo: Wikipedia
On October 24, a Ukrainian delegation headed by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych traveled to Moscow to discuss the status of the Azov-Kerch water area. On December 24, in Kerch, Kuchma and Putin sign an agreement on cooperation in the use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait. According to the agreement, Russia and Ukraine will jointly use the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait. Military ships attempting to enter the Azov Sea must obtain the consent of both countries. Russian ships are exempted from paying for the right to pass through the Kerch-Yenikalsky Canal, and Russia becomes a partner of Ukraine in its operation.
How to assess the results of the conflict for Ukraine and Russia?
Some Ukrainian sources present the Tuzla conflict as a victory, but this assessment is not entirely correct. Probably, we can say that Ukraine won the conflict itself, but lost during the signing of the treaty. At the same time, Russia can be considered a winner. Tuzla Island itself is of little importance. However, control over the entry of ships into the Sea of Azov and, in particular, access to the Kerch-Yenikalsk Canal is a significant achievement in geopolitical terms. Of course, on the eve of the Russian presidential election, it would be good to show the mass audience the material proof of Putin's invincibility. However, it should be understood that Russia has put very little effort into this conflict and risked absolutely nothing. And Putin's cynical statement: "We haven't even begun yet!" is as applicable as ever to the events of 2003. From the outside, everything looked as if the Russian president had intervened in time to prevent a local misunderstanding and stopped the energetic governor of the Krasnodar Territory.
Leonid Kuchma can also be considered the winner of this conflict. He went down in Ukrainian history as the president who defended the country's interests on the brink of an armed conflict. In 2004, in honor of the anniversary of Ukraine's liberation from the German invaders, Putin stood on the podium next to Kuchma. The maneuvering strategy brought results.
Another result of the conflict was the appearance of a Ukrainian border outpost on Tuzla.
The conflict at Tuzla was supposed to be a terrible prophecy of future events for Ukraine, like the mysterious words King Belshazzar saw on the wall during his feast. Instead, the conflict was seen as a misunderstanding between two close friends. Even in 2007, in his new book, Kuchma expressed the opinion that he did not believe that Putin had ordered the capture of Tuzla. Kuchma continued to be in close contact with Putin until the end of his term, considering Tuzla his political victory. In the wake of the first success, Russia made significant efforts to ensure that Viktor Yanukovych won the 2004 elections, eventually achieving its goal in 2010. What happened in 2014 is well known.
Moscow has never concealed that it has an extreme interest in Ukrainian Crimea. The first clash between Ukraine and Russia occurred back in 1992-94 during the so-called Crimean crisis. In 1997, an agreement was signed on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, which could not be called beneficial for Ukraine. In the 1990s, Russian propaganda began bombing the territory of southern Ukraine, which did not have an adequate response from our side. That is, the mines that exploded in 2014 were laid by Russia on purpose and for the long term.
Back in 2003, Putin demonstrated how effectively he could use his favorite method of provocation. Back then, tactics such as biased media coverage, research by pseudo-scientists, inspired political rallies, "we are not there", etc. were used to achieve results. The power of Putin's provocations lies in the fact that the initiator cannot lose even in the worst case scenario. At the same time, each new provocation probes the ground and provides essential information for developing a further strategy.
Did Russia plan a direct armed clash with Ukraine in 2003? Such a development seems unlikely. Rather, it was hoping to go the route of a "peaceful" squeeze of Tuzla, similar to what happened a year earlier with Kazakhstan. After all, in 2003, Putin was just gaining experience, and the Ukrainian army still retained a significant combat capability. The destruction and plundering of the Ukrainian army was rapid in the 2000s, and was later completed by Yanukovych.
Every historical conflict provides a wealth of material for analysis and reflection. Unfortunately, most of the clues provided by history become clear only after the fact.
Олег Пархітько
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