Artem Vivdych: "According to the Strategy, one must first and foremost be an effective manager, not a politician"

What should Odessa’s new development strategy look like, why does the city lack the data needed for effective planning, and what prevents strategies from working in Ukraine? Intent spoke with Artem Vivdych, an expert in strategic planning, about these issues.

As far as I know, you were involved in the work on the Odesa Development Strategy. What exactly was your role in the process of preparing and shaping it?

I was one of the consultants at the Agency for Recovery and Development, which won the tender to provide consulting support for the strategy’s development. The tender was announced by the municipal institution “Odesa 5T Grant Office” using funds from the Japanese government provided through the United Nations Development Program. The agency assembled a group of experts, and I was one of them, specializing in public safety.

So your work consisted specifically of providing consulting services?

We had to analyze the situation. To do this, we worked with various departments, primarily the Department of Economy, which is responsible for strategic planning and collecting data from other departments. We determined what data needed to be collected, and the departments provided the information they already had. We also analyzed targeted programs and relevant strategic documents and held meetings with active residents, representatives of civil society organizations, and city council departments. If I’m not mistaken, there were ten or eleven such working meetings.

That was the contractual part of the work. The draft Strategy was submitted to the Department of Economy as the process coordinator, after which it was finalized by the executive bodies.

But there was another aspect related to public participation. I am the head of a civic organization, so we did a little more than what was specified in the tender requirements.

I heard from several experts right away that not enough time had been allocated for the Odesa 26/27 Development Strategy. So how much time do you think is needed to develop an effective strategy?

A year to a year and a half. I’ve been working on strategies since around 2016, and I’ve also studied the experiences of European and American cities. For a city with a population of one million, developing a strategy takes about a year and a half. Of course, this is under peaceful conditions, with proper preparation, and if the municipality isn’t developing a strategy for the first time.

A series of important studies must be conducted. For example, I served as a consultant during the development of the Odesa Regional Strategy in 2023–2024. For that project, we commissioned a separate sociological study from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, and that study alone took 3–4 months.

The team working on the Odesa Development Strategy included experts in various fields. Each gathered data through meetings with residents, surveys, and desk research, but ideally, there should have been even more specialized experts—for example, in tourism, transportation, and logistics. Separate, in-depth specialized studies are also needed.

Given the short timeframe for development and the short duration of Strategy 26/27 itself, we incorporated preparations for the next planning phase (28/34) into it. In other words, this is not a comprehensive long-term strategy. However, as a result of implementing the measures outlined in this Strategy, studies should be conducted and documentation developed that can serve as a foundation for preparing the next Strategy.

The Strategy was adopted for less than two years. Which decisions made during the Strategy’s development were compromises, given the short timeframe until the end of the 27th year?

I don’t like compromises [smiles]. There were good decisions, and there were compromises. I wouldn’t say they were wrong, but they certainly can’t be called positive.

Let me give an example of a good decision. The Strategy begins with a vision of how residents see Odesa in the future. In various Ukrainian strategies, this vision often sounds optimistic: a city of the future where everyone lives comfortably, everyone is happy, and everyone has a job. When we were developing the vision for Odesa, we tried to make it relevant for several decades. I would have expected that this vision would be retained when developing the new Strategy.

In addition, the Odessa community’s vision is aligned with the region’s development vision. The teams of experts who worked on the city and regional strategies overlapped significantly, so we took some of their findings and research into account. Maintaining such long-term guidelines for 10–20 years also serves to protect the city from political changes. City leadership may change, but the overall direction of development remains the same.

The downside, in my opinion, is that the Strategy covers practically everything. A strategy is an answer to the question of how to best focus limited resources on key development areas for maximum impact. There cannot be an infinite number of such areas.

In this case, the number of objectives outlined in the Strategy is so large that virtually any idea from any department could be included. There are even potentially conflicting priorities—for example, developing port logistics while simultaneously promoting tourism. In such a case, it is necessary to determine—already at the level of spatial planning—where the industrial zone will be located and where the tourist zone will be. In other words, one way or another, there must be a distribution of growth areas.

When the draft Strategy was submitted to the city, how different was it from the document that was ultimately approved?

When the group of consultants submitted the draft Strategy, there were 113 objectives. In the final version, there were 232. The departments decided to incorporate as many of their ideas as possible into the Strategy.

Let me explain why this happens. Previously, Odesa could function without an overarching strategy because there were separate targeted programs and specialized documents—such as a cultural strategy, a youth strategy, and so on. Then, due to changes in the law, the strategy became a mandatory document for local communities. If a project is included in the Strategy and the action plan, this opens up opportunities for funding from the local or state budget.

This approach is intended to encourage communities to develop in line with a strategic vision: to plan years in advance, focus resources, and be less dependent on political circumstances. But in practice, there is a temptation to include as many projects as possible in the Strategy in order to be able to fund them in the future. As a result, the requirement for a strategic document is formally met, but the focus becomes blurred.

There is also a European dimension. The European Union operates on seven-year planning and budgeting cycles, and an increasing number of relevant funding programs are gradually becoming available to Ukraine. For Odesa, in particular, cross-border cooperation instruments are available. A project that aligns with the city’s Strategy has a stronger case when seeking external funding.

Therefore, the Strategy is a practical tool for both managing priorities and planning funding. We have partially succeeded in the second task by including many potential projects. However, we still need to work on the first—identifying the true focal points of development.

This cannot be accomplished in a single strategic cycle. We need to assess what worked in the previous cycle, what was accomplished, and what proved to be too ambitious or unrealistic. It is an evolutionary process. I hope that Odesa is moving in this direction and that it won’t all end with a mere formal requirement to have a Strategy. Especially now, when our resources are very limited due to the war and we need to use them as effectively as possible.

More than half a year has passed since the Strategy was approved in February 2026. Do you think the process of implementing the Strategy is already underway?

I’m sure it’s happening in one way or another. The community has targeted programs and a budget that are being implemented. When the Strategy was being developed, the departments reviewed their plans and targeted programs and incorporated them into the Strategy. In other words, these processes were synchronized.

However, based on the indicators, I can’t comment on this yet. The Strategy includes a reporting procedure, and we’ll get a real picture of the departments’ work after monitoring and reporting. My colleagues in the civil society sector and I are also working to help monitor and keep residents informed about what’s happening.

But the strategy-building process itself has already set in motion a number of other processes.

What specific processes do you have in mind?

A City Strategic Development Council was established in Odesa. This is a consultative and advisory body designed to help determine the directions of Odesa’s development. I consider the very fact of its creation to be positive.

I won’t assess the quality of the entire process just yet. Odesa is still a long way from Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, or Kyiv, where strategic planning is already institutionalized to a certain extent. But Odesa has a Strategic Development Council, as well as “Office 5T,” which could eventually develop into an analytical center similar to Lviv’s City Institute.

There is also momentum from the public sector. In 2025, 25 civil society organizations signed a memorandum expressing their willingness to participate in developing the Strategy and collecting data. In parallel with our meetings, they held about ten additional meetings with their target audiences on a volunteer basis and submitted the collected data to support work on the Strategy.

In January 2026, the creation of the “Odesa Strategy” civic association was announced; it currently comprises 11 civic organizations. After the Strategy was adopted, civic organizations also submitted 33 projects for inclusion in the action plan. Eighteen of them remained in the approved version. The public participation mechanism worked, although by no means all proposals ultimately made it into the document.

In other words, I see that processes are underway both within the municipality and in the civil society sector, and there is periodic communication between them.

I recently attended a meeting with Andriy Fedotov. He emphasized the need to collect data to develop a strategy. What data about Odesa is most lacking today for proper strategic planning?

The data situation is dire. I fully agree with him on this. Quality management decisions must be based on evidence and facts. The problem has worsened during the war because some registries were closed, and others are no longer being maintained properly. We lack accurate data on demographics and economic sectors. There has been talk of municipal statistics for many years, but legislative changes are needed to implement them.

One way to partially compensate for the lack of data is through sociological surveys. We conducted such surveys while developing the Odesa regional strategy, but no funding was allocated for them during the preparation of the city strategy.

It’s difficult to comprehensively solve this problem right now. Some statistics are restricted due to security concerns, and it’s also hard to accurately calculate demographics because of constant population movements. Perhaps new tools will emerge—such as electronic surveys via “Diy” or other registries.

What can be done right now at the city level?

Data can be collected through questionnaires, surveys, and in-depth interviews. We’ve done this. It’s important to engage the business community, particularly the largest taxpayers and business associations. This requires trust, and the City Strategic Development Council can help here.

But most importantly, data collection must be ongoing. We can’t simply announce that we’re starting to develop a Strategy and only then begin gathering information. Someone needs to regularly collect and process information so that the data is already available by the time the new planning cycle begins.

In my opinion, this could be coordinated by the Department of Economy through the City Strategic Development Council and advisory bodies involving the business community. Civil society organizations, district administrations, homeowners’ associations, and other local networks can participate in data collection. For a city with a population of one million, this is a complex and lengthy process, which is why I say that it takes a year to a year and a half to develop a high-quality Strategy.

You mentioned several examples of Ukrainian cities where the strategy is being implemented effectively. Can we somehow apply their experience to Odesa? Can you give specific examples of what Odesa could learn from them?

In Ivano-Frankivsk, more than ten years ago, a group of civic organizations and entrepreneurs came together independently of the government and began working to develop the community. Eventually, the authorities began to take notice of them. They developed a vision for the city’s branding; the business community established a fund to provide mini-grants for local initiatives; and later, a participatory budget was introduced. This is an example where the demand for strategic development came from active residents and small and medium-sized businesses.

In Lviv, the city government plays a stronger role. There is the City Institute—a municipal institution for which developing general and thematic strategies and collecting data is part of its daily work. In other words, there is a permanent institution dedicated to the city’s development.

I worked in Mariupol for a long time before the occupation. There, together with USAID, we planned to create a platform where discussions about the city’s development and transformation could take place—discussions that would cover not only strategic issues but also concrete implementation. For example, if funding becomes available to renovate a hospital, residents could be consulted on which specific hospital to renovate and what exactly needs to be fixed there.

The idea of such a platform sounds wonderful. But it seems to me that in Odesa, it would be more difficult for people to meet regularly and discuss such matters.

The key here is trust—between people, and between the government and the public. Why did we gather? Will the outcome be put to use? Is this just a waste of time, or a way to legitimize a decision that’s already been made? Such doubts arise precisely because of a lack of trust.

It’s not a quick process. Trust can take months to build and can be lost very quickly. That’s why the government itself should take the initiative to maintain ongoing communication with the public. In Vinnytsia, for example, there is a platform called “City of Meanings,” where people regularly discuss what is being built in the city and the direction in which it is developing.

There is another level of trust—between the communities themselves. In Lviv, an association of communities in the metropolitan area was created, and together they address issues related to transportation, waste management, and water supply. When we were working on the Odesa regional strategy, neighboring communities feared that Odesa would expand and incorporate their territories, but that they would gain nothing from it.

That’s why it’s important for Odesa to build a dialogue with neighboring communities: to ask what they need and what the city can offer. There are many shared problems that are more effectively solved together.

It seems we agree that Strategy 26/27 effectively lacks a strategic direction—there’s no prioritization of one thing over another. How should we approach the new strategy to ensure that this direction is indeed established? I remember what you said at the beginning of our conversation. Experts developed a draft, handed it over to local officials, who added their own “wish lists” and watered down what might have been there initially. How can we avoid this mistake and ensure that this direction is established?

This is a major undertaking that must be carried out by specialized experts. I can cite the example of Mariupol. We hired American consultants who conducted benchmark studies—comparing the city’s performance with that of other cities.

Odessa could be compared to cities of similar size and level of development, as well as to neighboring Black Sea cities. We could compare investment and tourism appeal, as well as quality of life. This helps us understand where the city is stronger, where it is weaker, and what we should focus on. Such an analysis requires experts, time, and, above all, data.

The second approach is to draw on the experience of other cities. We can select cities with similar characteristics and look back to see how they developed. For example, we can compare Odessa with Marseille or Gdańsk as port cities. Examine what they were like 15–30 years ago, what decisions they made, and what worked. If the difference in development is small, we can analyze what they’re doing now. This kind of analysis also takes months.

Another level is sector-specific economic analysis. In Mariupol, we hired economists to examine which industries are growing globally and in Ukraine, and where there is growth potential. For example, it turned out that healthcare could be not only a social service but also a separate sector of the economy. However, despite our proximity to the sea, our analysis led us to conclude that investments in the fishing industry were not promising.

We need to either commission experts to conduct such research or develop such experts ourselves. For example, there is no business school in Odesa. In my opinion, this is a problem. Why does Lviv have the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU), while we have no alternatives? People come from all over Ukraine to study at UCU. They produce master’s degree holders in public administration and managers, while Odesa does not. Where can we recruit qualified managers for our agencies, departments, and municipal institutions if we lack such personnel?

But isn’t MAUP an example of a university that can train such professionals?

I’m not ready to say for sure. I think they do offer that program. But at UCU, during the one-and-a-half-year master’s program, there are study abroad trips and guest lectures by foreign instructors. I doubt MAUP offers anything like that. Can they train such professionals? Perhaps. But will it be at the high level we’d like to see? That’s another question.

How should we develop the 28/34 strategy, given the ongoing war? Is it even possible to reconcile the strategy with the war?

From a process standpoint, we can. After all, last year we were able to hold meetings and conduct surveys, collect data, and define strategic goals. Perhaps not everything is fully accessible: we won’t be able to conduct a full-scale street survey or organize a large forum. But to a certain extent, it can and must be done.

Another question is what kind of outcome we’re aiming for. It would be great to have a high-quality seven-year strategy, but in wartime, it’s very difficult to plan that far ahead. So if the next strategy is less ambitious, I don’t think that’s a major problem.

For example, in the economy, we don’t have to try to cover all sectors; instead, we can choose one or two that are critical right now. The same goes for transportation: we shouldn’t talk about a large-scale new road if that’s unrealistic, but rather focus, for example, on traffic management.

At the same time, we need to be prepared for the fact that, due to the war, some of the plans will have to be changed. In other words, the Strategy must be highly adaptable.

Let’s imagine for a moment that in 2034, the Odesa Development Strategy is deemed a success. What would fundamentally need to change in Odesa—aside from the end of the war—for the impact of the Strategy to be evident?

A strategy is a roadmap, not a checklist where every item must be checked off. I would frame the question differently: Did we stick to it and move in the intended direction? If so, we can already speak of a successful implementation.

Let’s say we planned a thousand projects but completed two hundred. Does that mean the Strategy has failed? Not necessarily, especially in the context of war. If those two hundred projects were implemented in line with the defined direction, that’s a good result. It’s better to move more slowly but consistently than to rush around and scatter resources.

Another important indicator is the attitude of the residents themselves. I believe it’s good practice to regularly ask people whether they feel the community is moving in the right direction. Such a survey should be conducted at least a few times over the course of a seven-year cycle.

Plus, there need to be specific indicators. Each project has its own. Returning to the transportation example, these could be travel time or the speed of travel from point A to point B. The combination of objective metrics and the residents’ own perceptions will serve as an indicator of the Strategy’s success.

At the Odesa Strategy Conference, one of the speakers said that, unfortunately, strategies don’t work in Ukraine. Would you agree with that point of view?

In 90 out of 100 cases, they don’t work.

Why is that? What’s wrong with us?

Maybe it’s human nature? Look, I’m on vacation right now. I woke up this morning and can either have breakfast or skip it; I can go here or there. And from an emotional standpoint, I like it that way. But if I had a strategy, I’d have to stick to a schedule and do exactly what’s planned.

It’s not always comfortable for mayors to live by strategies either—they have to do what’s written there instead of what they want to do. And that’s where corrupt interests can come into play. For example, the Strategy calls for developing tram service, but it’s more profitable for someone to promote bus service. Then you have to choose between a strategic decision and someone’s specific interest.

There’s also a political issue to consider. Sometimes it’s easier to make a popular decision now than a difficult one whose results won’t be visible for several years. Reforms are often painful: at first, people experience inconveniences, and the benefits come later. If the Strategy is truly developed professionally, it will almost inevitably include such complex decisions.

On the other hand, a mayor who is prepared to govern according to the Strategy spares himself a lot of headaches. There is a document in place; based on it, he can assign tasks to deputies and departments, align their performance metrics with those of the Strategy, formulate the budget, and demand accountability.

But then you also have to tell the city council members: we’re funding what’s outlined in the Strategy, not just distributing money in a way that’s politically convenient for someone. That’s more difficult. To follow the Strategy, you must first and foremost be an effective manager, not a politician.

I’m addressing you as someone with experience communicating with Europeans. Perhaps I’m idealizing Germany a bit. They have corruption too; mayors and politicians have their own “pet projects.” But even so, they still keep the process moving forward. Here, our effectiveness is often negative, yet we’re always very surprised when something actually works. Is this a matter of our mentality? Can this be changed somehow?

There’s a saying: it’s better to steal from the positives than from the negatives. I don’t know why here we often steal specifically from the negatives—there’s something left, and they take it. Even though, in a developing economy, both the people who earn a living and businesses stand to gain.

I think our attitude toward the country matters here. Do we see it as our own? Do we tie our own future and our children’s future to it? In the past, the answer to many of these questions was often “no.”

The war has changed that to some extent. I talk to soldiers and veterans, and many say they ’re fighting for change. They have a strong sense of justice and responsibility for what the country should look like after the war.

But that alone isn’t enough. The second part involves effectively organizing the process through laws, institutions, and governance approaches. We’ve already undergone decentralization, which gave communities more responsibility and resources, but this process isn’t complete yet.

In other words, I wouldn’t attribute everything to mindset alone. There is the issue of people’s attitudes toward the state, but there is also the issue of the rules of the game. If both of these things change, then there is a chance that strategies and other long-term decisions will actually begin to work.

This article was prepared by Intent as part of a partnership within the “Circle of Influence” project. The editorial team independently determines the content, focus, and conclusions of this publication.

The initiative is implemented by the NGO “Community Development Fund ‘DOBRO’” in collaboration with the NGO “STEP” as part of the “Circle of Influence” project, with support from NED. Project partners: the NGO “Zmistom,” the Public Association “Odessa Strategy,” the Odesa City Council’s Department of Economic Development, the Odesa City Council’s Department of Labor and Social Policy, the social communications agency “Shchyro,” and Intent Media.

Олег Пархітько