Two Faces of Europe: Helping Ukraine and the Aggressor

Last week, the EU reached an agreement on the REPowerEU regulation aimed at phasing out Russian gas imports, a long-awaited step toward reducing the financing of Russia's war against Ukraine. The regulation introduces a legally binding phase-out ban on imports of both liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline gas from Russia, with a complete ban starting in late 2026 and fall 2027, respectively.

This was reported by the press service of the Council of the European Union.

Thus, the European Union and the European Parliament have reached a preliminary political agreement on a regulation that provides for a phased ban on imports of Russian natural gas, both pipeline and liquefied natural gas.

It is noted that this agreement will contribute to achieving the main goal of creating a sustainable and independent EU energy market, while maintaining security of supply to the EU.

How it will work

According to the agreed rules, a complete ban on imports of Russian LNG will come into force on January 1, 2027. Imports of pipeline gas must be stopped no later than September 30, 2027, and under certain conditions - by November 1, 2027. A transition period has been provided for existing contracts. Any changes to the existing contracts will be allowed only for technical reasons and will not be able to increase the volume of supplies.

The co-legislators confirmed that imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG will be banned six weeks after the entry into force of the regulation, while maintaining a transitional period for existing contracts. In particular:

• For short-term supply contracts concluded before June 17, 2025, the ban on Russian gas imports will apply from April 25, 2026 for LNG and from June 17, 2026 for pipeline gas.
• As for long-term LNG import contracts, the ban will apply from January 1, 2027, in accordance with the 19th package of sanctions.
• As regards long-term contracts for imports of gas by pipeline, the ban will enter into force on September 30, 2027, provided that Member States are on track to meet the storage targets set out in the gas storage regulation and no later than November 1, 2027.
• Amendments to existing contracts will be allowed only for narrowly defined operational purposes and cannot lead to an increase in volumes.

The Co-Legislators also included a requirement that both categories of gas imports be subject to a prior authorization regime to ensure that the ban is applied in practice

• for Russian gas and imports covered by the transitional period, the information required to obtain a permit must be provided at least one month before entry
• for non-Russian gas, confirmation must be provided at least five days prior to entry and 7 days for gas imported through the Stranja 1 interconnection point.

In order to reduce the administrative burden, the co-legislators agreed that this pre-authorization procedure will not apply to imports from countries that meet certain criteria, such as major gas producing countries that exported more than 5 bcm of natural gas to the EU in 2024 and that ban or restrict imports of Russian gas, or countries without any infrastructure for imports. Based on ongoing monitoring by customs and licensing authorities, the Commission may update the list of exempted countries and, if necessary, may remove countries from the list, for example, in case of documented circumvention.

Calls to close loopholes

Despite the European Union's commitment under the REPowerEU program to eliminate dependence on Russian fossil fuels after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, significant political and economic resistance remains. While gas imports from Russia via pipelines to the EU have fallen sharply, LNG imports have increased by 7% year-on-year in early 2025, bringing in over €3 billion from April to September 2025 alone. This continued trade undermines the EU's energy security goals, climate commitments under the European Green Deal, and efforts to isolate Russia economically. The continuation of Russian energy flows is indicative of systematic networks of influence, including corporate interests, political actors and financial dependence, that impede the transition away from Russian fossil fuels.

According to experts, the current priorities are to strictly enforce the ban, eliminate all loopholes that allow indirect flow of Russian gas through intermediaries, and ensure transparent and credible national diversification plans for all member states. The latest Agreement comes at a crucial time. With Russia's full-scale invasion now in its fourth year, Europe is scrambling to close the remaining channels through which Russian pipeline gas, LNG and oil products are diverted through intermediaries, which continue to enter the EU market.

The agreement is the result of strong pressure from civil society, as more than 30 organizations called on negotiators to adopt a stronger position of the European Parliament, eliminate loopholes and resist attempts by some member states to weaken the text.

In particular, the organizations called for:

• Limiting the list of "trusted countries" proposed by the European Parliament to those countries that have a clear legal ban on Russian gas, such as the UK and Norway. The submitted recommendations provide detailed examples of how the exclusions of Qatar, Nigeria, and Algeria could pose threats to the EU in terms of concealing Russian gas or energy security.
• Maintain the European Parliament's strict fines, including a minimum threshold of 5% for administrative fines, to deter fraud and ensure effective implementation of the Regulation.
• Remove the "security of supply" suspension clause, as it undermines the purpose of the Regulation by allowing a temporary return to Russian gas and reopening the door to political blackmail.
• Support and strengthen national oil and gas diversification plans and ensure their publicity. It is crucial to support these plans to ensure transparency, accountability and coordinated efforts for phase-out across the EU. National diversification plans, particularly for oil, should include specific milestones and legally binding deadlines.

Implementation will determine whether this victory is meaningful or symbolic.

How Western business helps Russia

Calls for increased pressure on the EU are coming from the fact that such sanctions may again become declarative, and the terrorist country will again circumvent them.

LNG delivery route to Europe and Asia. PHOTO: Malte Humpert/High North News

For example, the EU sanctioned Russia's Arctic LNG 2 project in 2023. However, Western companies continue to own stakes in and buy from Yamal LNG and Sakhalin-2, Russia's two operating Arctic facilities. Yamal alone paid $9.5 billion to the Russian federal budget between 2022 and 2024.

On November 6, 2025, Ukraine imposed a new round of sanctions against Russia's key fossil fuel expansion projects in the Arctic, followed by further sanctions at the European Union level. The new package of sanctions imposed by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine targets , among others, key individuals and organizations that facilitate the Kremlin's fossil fuel exports from the Arctic and contribute to climate catastrophe.

It is noted that the financial link between LNG exports from the Arctic and Russia's military campaign can no longer be ignored. This is not a theory. This is blood money. Every LNG tanker leaving the Arctic and exporting fossil gas carries the price of Ukrainian lives.

After Europe cut off Russian gas supplies through pipelines and imposed sanctions on the Arctic LNG-2 project, one might think that Russia's Arctic strategy has failed. However, this is not the case. "Yamal LNG is still operating at full capacity without sanctions, exporting more than 17 axis million tons of gas annually. More than 2⁄3 of Russia's Yamal LNG cargoes are still destined for EU buyers.

Image: https://euromaidanpress.com/

"Yamal LNG remains closely tied to Europe, both through its customers and its logistics infrastructure: its key long-term customers include France's TotalEnergies, the project's major shareholder and a supplier of gas to UK government facilities, and Germany's SEFE (formerly Gazprom Germania), a state-owned energy company mired in suspicions of continued Russian influence.

Experts note that the need for stronger sanctions against Russian fossil fuel projects in the Arctic is now clearly a critical gap that needs to be addressed immediately, including the Arctic LNG 2 and Yamal LNG projects, as well as ships exporting Russian fossil fuels via the Northern Sea Route.

Additional pressure on Russia

Despite business, politicians and government officials are trying to put additional pressure on the aggressor. Thus, in early December, the European Commission blacklisted Russia for money laundering, terrorist financing, and the use of global financial systems to support aggression against Ukraine and other criminal activities.

On July 8, 2025, the Commission adopted Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1393. This regulation obliges the Commission to complete by the end of 2025 a review of third countries that are not on the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering(FATF) list but whose membership has been suspended. The aim is to assess whether changes to the EU's anti-money laundering list should be made based on this review.

The European Commission's press service said that since Russia is covered by this Delegated Regulation, the Commission carried out a technical assessment using clearly defined methodologies and taking into account information gathered from public sources, competent authorities of Member States and the European External Action Service. The assessment concluded that Russia meets the criteria for designation as a third high-risk country.

By adding Russia to the EU's list of high-risk jurisdictions, financial institutions, in accordance with the EU's anti-money laundering/terrorist financing framework, must apply enhanced due diligence when conducting transactions with Russian counterparties. Experts note that this significantly complicates the movement of illicit funds through European markets, helping to close channels used to circumvent sanctions or finance aggression.

The delegated regulation will enter into force after consideration and no objections by the European Parliament and Council within one month. This period may be extended for another month. The Commission will monitor the progress of all countries on the list and will continue to follow relevant developments.

Володимир Шкаєв