The Cost of the Blockade: How Much Ukraine Is Losing Due to Russian Attacks on Its Ports ^{Advertisement}

July 2026 was a hot month for Ukraine—not only because of the weather, but also due to a sharp escalation in Russian attacks on port infrastructure and civilian shipping. Strikes on docks, grain terminals, warehouses, and ships are increasingly taking the form of a systematic campaign aimed at reducing the throughput capacity of Ukrainian ports, intimidating international shipowners, and making maritime exports more expensive and risky.

In just one month—from June 20 to July 20—Russian forces attacked 28 civilian merchant ships in the ports of Greater Odesa. According to the Odesa Regional Prosecutor’s Office, 21 people were killed as a result of these strikes. Moreover, the attacks target not only ships while they are being loaded or leaving the port, but also vessels moored at docks, awaiting repairs, or not engaged in any cargo operations at all. This undermines Russian claims about the alleged military nature of such targets and indicates deliberate pressure on civilian shipping.

The scale of the destruction is growing almost every week. According to data cited by Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga in late July, since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian strikes have damaged or destroyed 1,054 port infrastructure facilities, struck 232 civilian vessels, and 307 civilians have been killed or wounded. Sybiga emphasized that the Russian campaign against the Black Sea corridor did not begin in July 2026: strikes on ports, grain storage facilities, crews, and export infrastructure have been carried out systematically since 2022.

The intensity of the attacks in 2026 significantly exceeded that of the previous year. According to estimates provided by Deputy Prime Minister for Recovery Oleksiy Kuleba and representatives of the agricultural sector, more than 180 strikes on Ukrainian ports were recorded in the first half of the year, compared to about 150 for the entire year of 2025. At the same time, tactics are shifting: whereas terminals, warehouses, and berths were previously the main targets, Russia is now increasingly attacking civilian vessels directly in ports and along the maritime corridor.

Direct damage to Ukraine’s port infrastructure has already exceeded $1.5 billion. This estimate comes from Denys Marchuk, deputy chairman of the All-Ukrainian Agrarian Council. According to him, port operators’ own resources are no longer sufficient to continuously restore damaged facilities. This figure refers only to physically destroyed or damaged facilities—without taking into account downtime, lost contracts, lost revenue, and additional costs for storing and rerouting cargo.

At the same time, the first half of the year demonstrated just how crucial ports remain for the Ukrainian economy. According to the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority, ports handled 42.4 million metric tons of cargo from January through June—more than during the same period in 2025. Agricultural products accounted for 23.6 million metric tons, or more than half of the total cargo volume; their transshipment increased by 20%. This means that the July escalation occurred at a time when maritime logistics had not only recovered from the blockade during the early years of the war but had also once again become the mainstay of Ukrainian exports.

Since August 2023, over 200 million metric tons of cargo have been transported via the Ukrainian Maritime Corridor. Ukrainian products are shipped to 56 countries via this route. Mykola Kravchuk, head of the USPA, attributes the ports’ operations to the joint efforts of port workers, sailors, logistics specialists, the military, the business community, and international partners. At the same time, he emphasizes that attacks on civilian infrastructure, port workers, and ship crews constitute a violation of international law and the principle of freedom of navigation.

The attacks are hitting the agricultural sector the hardest. About 90% of Ukraine’s agricultural exports pass through the ports of Greater Odesa, so even a short-term reduction in their throughput capacity quickly affects the entire market. According to Deputy Minister of Economy Taras Vysotsky, damage to infrastructure could reduce monthly export volumes from approximately 6 million to 4 million metric tons. He estimates the potential loss of foreign exchange revenue at nearly $900 million per month.

This does not mean that all exports have come to a halt, but even temporary disruptions have a cumulative effect. Grain remains in elevators longer, storage costs rise, farmers receive payment later, and have less working capital for the next planting season. According to the Ukrainian Grain Association, due to problems with agricultural exports, carryover stocks at the start of the new season approached 13 million metric tons, compared to 7.4 million metric tons at the start of the previous season. At the same time, with a grain and oilseed harvest of 83.6 million metric tons, Ukraine has the potential to export 50.8 million metric tons in the 2026/2027 marketing year. Realizing this potential will depend primarily on the stability of maritime logistics.

The attacks are already affecting the operations of specific companies. Following several attacks, the agricultural holding “Kernel” was forced to suspend operations at its damaged facilities in Chornomorsk. Maersk temporarily suspended service through one of the terminals at the Chornomorsk Fishing Port, citing the security situation and the feeder operator’s inability to continue operations as the reasons for the decision. An important clarification from the Ministry of Community and Territorial Development: this did not mean a complete shutdown of the Chornomorsk seaport or the entire Ukrainian corridor. However, it is precisely such localized decisions that demonstrate how military risks are gradually narrowing the range of available carriers and routes.

The industry publication Lloyd’s List described operating conditions off the Ukrainian coast in July as the most challenging since the Black Sea Grain Initiative was suspended in 2023. According to its assessment, shipowners are becoming increasingly cautious about calling at Ukrainian ports, the number of available vessels is shrinking, and freight and insurance costs are rising. Consequently, losses occur even when a port is technically still operating: an additional risk premium is factored into the cost of each metric ton of cargo, ultimately reducing the price received by Ukrainian producers.

Rail, road transport, and Danube ports can absorb part of the cargo flow, but they are unable to quickly and fully replace the deep-water ports of Greater Odesa. According to Vysotsky’s estimate, approximately 1 million metric tons per month could be redirected to the Danube route, but such logistics are more expensive. Using ports in neighboring countries also means longer transport distances, transshipment at borders, and dependence on the capacity of European rail and port infrastructure.

The risks are not limited to the agricultural sector. The maritime corridor has enabled Ukrainian mining and metallurgical enterprises to return to distant markets where delivery by rail is economically unfeasible. According to GMK Center estimates, more than 60% of Ukraine’s iron ore was shipped by sea before the full-scale war. A single bulk carrier loaded with ore can generate over $14 million in export revenue, while a vessel carrying metal products can generate about $16.5 million. Therefore, every week of unstable operations in the corridor results in losses not only for the ports but also for mining companies, metallurgical enterprises, the railways, and the state budget.

Denys Marchuk considers the attacks on ports to be one of the main constraints on the Ukrainian agricultural sector. Representatives of the Ukrainian Ports Association “Ukrport” emphasize that shipping must remain free and secure, and that port operators need not only physical protection but also mechanisms for compensating for war-related losses. In July, the government had already considered expanding insurance and compensation for war risks covering both state-owned and private port infrastructure. Without such a mechanism, it will become increasingly difficult for businesses to restore terminals after each new attack.

The consequences will be felt not only by Ukraine. A reduction in Ukrainian shipments creates additional uncertainty for importers in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Any prolonged absence of Ukrainian volumes from the market could prop up global grain prices while simultaneously strengthening the position of Russian exporters, who compete directly with Ukraine. That is precisely why attacks on ports are not merely a means of inflicting physical damage, but an instrument of economic warfare and pressure on global food security.

Ukrainian ports continue to operate, and first-half figures demonstrate significant resilience. However, this resilience should not be confused with invulnerability. More than a thousand damaged facilities, 232 civilian vessels hit, at least $1.5 billion in direct losses, and rising costs for each sea voyage reveal the true cost of Russia’s campaign. The future of Ukrainian exports will depend not only on the repair of berths and terminals, but also on strengthening ports’ air defense, accessible insurance for war risks, and international guarantees of freedom of civilian navigation.

Source:https://khvl.info/news/czina-teroru-skilky-vtrachaye-ukrayina-cherez-rosijski-udary-po-portah/

Олена Болган