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20 June 2026, 22:25
A judge from the Odesa region was unable to overturn his dismissal
Ця стаття також доступна українською0
Podil City and District Court. PHOTO: Judicial Authority.
The High Council of Justice has decided to uphold the decision of its Second Disciplinary Chamber to hold Oleg Ivinsky, a judge of the Podil City and District Court of Odesa Oblast, accountable through disciplinary proceedings .
This was reported by the High Council of Justice’s press office.
Oleg Ivinsky was dismissed in April. Prior to that, in March, the High Council of Justice had decided to suspend considerationof the matter regardingOleg Ivinsky’s dismissal from his position as a judge of the Podilsk City and District Court of Odesa Oblast due to his submission of a resignation letter pending the consideration of the joint disciplinary case.
The Second Disciplinary Chamber of the High Council of Justice, by a ruling dated November 14, 2025, initiated a disciplinary case against the judge on its own initiative and merged it with the disciplinary case it had initiated by a ruling dated September 3, 2025, based on a complaint filed by the Patrol Police Department against the judge in question.
In July 2025, the judge had already been held disciplinarily liable and subjected to a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand, accompanied by the deprivation of the right to receive supplements to the judge’s official salary for one month. The fact is that the High Council of Justice had received two disciplinary complaints at that time, which stated that, in his rulings on cases involving administrative offenses,the judge hadexempted individuals from administrative liability for five driving violations, citing the minor nature of the offense, without taking into account that this is prohibited by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Based on the judge’s explanations, the High Council of Justice concluded that he was fully aware of the prohibition; yet, despite this, the judge applied this provision because he believed that, under martial law, revoking a driver’s license could harm the country’s defense capabilities, especially in the case of mobilized men.
