03 September 2026
(IMAGE: AI)
When talking to different people, it becomes clear that everyone wants the war to end, but everyone has very different ideas about exactly how it will end. There are even greater differences in understanding what victory and defeat might look like. If we look at the actions and rhetoric of world leaders from this perspective, it’s easy to conclude that the situation is roughly the same even at the highest levels of power. Therefore, it makes sense to examine the main scenarios for the war’s conclusion and understand the risks Ukraine faces in each of them.
We can identify four main scenarios for the further course and conclusion of Russia’s war against Ukraine: a protracted war, a frozen conflict, a Ukrainian victory, and a Ukrainian defeat. Regardless of which of these scenarios plays out, the war will have long-term social, economic, and political consequences.
Let’s start with this scenario so that we can end the article on a more positive note. It should be noted right away that Ukraine’s defeat does not necessarily mean surrender. Analysts distinguish between several forms.
A “soft” form of defeat. Ukraine retains its statehood, but:
This is a very unpleasant outcome, but it does not yet mean that Ukraine has lost its statehood.
The middle scenario —the aggressor gains significantly more:
This is where a fundamental problem arises, not only for Ukraine but also for Europe. In this scenario, Moscow would gain the ability to end the war now and start the next one whenever it suits them and against whomever they choose.
The worst-case scenario is a military collapse of Ukraine:
Let’s consider the possible scenarios for how defeat might occur.
A ceasefire is declared. In other words, the front line effectively stops, but not legally. Ukraine does not sign a surrender, but de facto loses the occupied territories. Another possibility is a scenario involving a major (possibly secret) agreement between the Trump administration and Russia. In other words, Ukraine becomes the object, rather than the subject, of the negotiations. And then this state of affairs will somehow have to be incorporated into the legal framework. It is a very big question exactly how this state of affairs will be legally formalized and what will happen to the initiator of such a legislative change, but in order to consider all options, we must note this possibility.
A less likely scenario than a frozen conflict. In this case, Russia breaks through the front lines and captures Kharkiv or Odesa. The Ukrainian government evacuates. The state continues to exist legally but loses control over most of its territory.
This would trigger an immediate outburst of outrage among Ukrainians and complete rejection of the signed documents. Given that the Verkhovna Rada must vote on this, lawmakers simply won’t be allowed to convene if there is even the slightest public suspicion of potential support for such a decision—meaning the internal legitimacy of such an agreement is simply impossible. It is also doubtful that the signing of such documents would be recognized by European Union countries as a legal act that has entered into force.
Internal instability in Ukraine. The old, ineffective, and corrupt political elite will try to claim moral immunity: “After all, we were at war with Russia.” But without a victory, this argument won’t hold water. As a result—internal upheaval and a change in government.
Humanitarian catastrophe: millions of refugees who are already abroad will not return.
Economic collapse: without the prospect of EU membership and without security guarantees, foreign investment will not flow in.
People’s loss of property in the occupied territories will be final and will not be compensated.
Ukraine will most likely become a state where revanchism becomes the dominant ideology. This will have very unpleasant consequences not only for Russia but also for other countries that the revanchists will accuse of betraying Ukraine.
For Europe as a whole, Ukraine’s defeat is tantamount to a catastrophe. This means that:
The China Factor. Beijing is watching closely. If aggression against a sovereign state is justified, Taiwan will be the next logical step.
The collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation system. In 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for the Budapest Memorandum. If that did not provide protection, then no country considering a nuclear program (Iran, Saudi Arabia) will voluntarily abandon it.
The NATO crisis. If the West did not protect Ukraine, will it protect Estonia? This is a question being openly discussed in Warsaw, Tallinn, and Helsinki.
Ukraine’s defeat is not merely a geopolitical defeat for a single country, but a systemic breakdown of the international order, the consequences of which will be felt not only by Ukraine’s neighbors but by the entire world—due to the precedent of nuclear blackmail, the collapse of the collective security system, and the message it sends to aggressors around the globe.
The scenarios here are much more pleasant to consider. We note that by the end of August 2026, neither side has achieved a strategic breakthrough. This state of affairs suggests that Russia will be forced to admit defeat—not through an explicit surrender or troop withdrawal, but as a result of systemic problems in the economy, the social sphere, and a political crisis.
Optimistic scenario. It is based on the assumption that Ukraine will successfully transition to drone warfare and gain a qualitative and quantitative technological advantage in it. The domestic defense-industrial complex will scale up production of long-range missiles. This will allow Ukraine to gain an advantage on the battlefield and significantly outpace the aggressor in terms of the number and quality of strikes deep into enemy territory.
This scenario envisions the formation of a new security architecture through diplomatic efforts, in which Ukraine becomes a full-fledged participant, receives NATO guarantees, and becomes an integral part of the Western defense perimeter. This does not necessarily mean the return of all occupied territories at once, but it does entail guaranteed security and membership in NATO and the EU as an irreversible reality. In this case, the issues of Crimea and Donbas could be resolved in the future through diplomatic measures or, alternatively, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions against Russia.
In the author’s view, this is the most likely outcome. There is no breakthrough on the front lines, but the aggressor ceases its offensive. Negotiations are conducted from a position of Ukrainian strength. The result is a ceasefire on terms that do not legitimize the annexation, plus security guarantees for Ukraine.
Victory does not automatically solve Ukraine’s internal problems. Some issues may recede into the background, but new ones will emerge. These very issues will become the main focus of the electoral process, which will begin immediately after the ceasefire. This is a topic for a separate article.
Reconstruction. The scale of the destruction is unprecedented. According to various estimates, between $500 billion and $1 trillion will be needed. But victory paves the way for real investments and EU loans.
European integration. EU membership becomes a realistic prospect within 5–10 years after victory, provided that genuine reforms are implemented. NATO membership is a key security element, without which any peace agreement is only temporary.
A Ukrainian victory will, in many ways, also be a victory for Europe.
The Chinese factor is key. A Ukrainian victory would significantly complicate any potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan. It would set a precedent showing that democracy can defend its sovereignty even against a nuclear power, provided it has Western support.
Nuclear nonproliferation. If the West does not succumb to Putin’s nuclear blackmail, nuclear weapons will no longer serve as a guarantee of unpunished aggression. This strengthens the nonproliferation regime.
The most interesting part of this analysis. Ukraine’s victory will intensify the internal crisis in the “swamps.” But it is important to understand that the proposed scenarios are unlikely to play out in their pure form. Each scenario may incorporate trends and factors from different scenario descriptions.
This option—a limited defeat of Russia—is currently the most desirable in the West, but it is practically impossible. Here, it is worth considering two sub-scenarios.
A. Putin remains in power, signs a peace treaty, declares it a strategic retreat, and maintains control through repression. The regime mimics defeat without actually losing, much like the USSR did after Afghanistan.
B. A “Putinocracy” without Putin. That is, the elites agree among themselves on a technical change of leadership while preserving the core elements of the system. This scenario roughly played out after Stalin’s death in 1953 and led to the Thaw, not to collapse.
A peaceful but irreversible process of disintegration will begin—as in 1989–1991, only much faster. This is a scenario in which regional elites gain strength at the expense of a weakened center. Among the candidates for secession are: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia, Chechnya (and possibly other Caucasian autonomous regions), and Buryatia.
American geopolitical analyst Peter Zeihan calls this scenario “a return to Muscovy”—Russia contracting to its ethnic core around Moscow.
Analysts describe this scenario as a mix of anarchy and violence. This option is the most dangerous both for Russia itself and for the world. Parallels here should be sought not in 1991, but in 1917.
Far-right ideologues from the Russian Federation presented a report at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in which future scenarios ranged from catastrophic defeat to an apocalyptic scenario involving the use of nuclear weapons.
The key question in the event of the Russian Federation’s collapse is who will control the nuclear arsenal. The former republics of the USSR, including Ukraine after 1991, transferred their nuclear arsenals to the Russian Federation in an organized manner and without significant problems. In the event of a chaotic collapse, such organization would be absent.
Regional conflicts could flare up both in places where they had previously been quelled and in entirely unexpected regions. The preconditions are standard: intelligence agencies, corrupt officials, and criminal groups could strike a deal anywhere across the vast territory of the Russian Federation with the aim of establishing their own authority. This could result in border wars between any parties. If a scenario of chaotic collapse were to unfold, it would be virtually impossible to predict all the hotspots of tension, given the sheer number of weapons and people ready to use them.
Political instability and the likelihood of regional conflicts will trigger migration flows. Migrants may flood not only into Europe. This crisis could affect a great many countries—from Kazakhstan to Myanmar and India.
Russia is a major supplier of energy resources, grain, fertilizers, and metals. A chaotic collapse could instantly knock these resources off the market, with unpredictable consequences for global inflation and food security. These goods will return to circulation fairly quickly, but a period of instability in global markets is highly likely.
Beijing views Siberia and the Far East as its natural sphere of influence. Russia’s weakening will almost certainly trigger Chinese expansion in these regions—likely economic at first, and then political.
No matter what borders Russia ends up with after the war, the most pressing question will be, “Who is to blame?” And whatever the answer, it will fuel revanchist sentiments. If Putin is to blame, the response will be that there was a lack of resolve. If people speak of betrayal, they will want to set things right. Here, it makes sense to draw parallels not with Germany in 1945, but with Germany in 1918. Given that the defeated side possesses nuclear weapons, the issue of international security will remain relevant for a long time to come.
It is important to realize that Russia’s defeat in the war by no means implies the automatic collapse of Russia or the democratization of the country. The most likely scenario is not a “new Russia the day after surrender,” but rather a fairly prolonged period of struggle within the Russian elite over who will control the state, the army, the intelligence services, and the nuclear arsenal.
At present, there is no clear-cut scenario with a guaranteed outcome. But the overwhelming majority of analysts agree on one thing: a controlled collapse of the Russian Federation is better than a chaotic one, and maintaining control over nuclear weapons is an absolute priority for global security.
As for Ukraine, we may witness a paradox. For us, the best possible outcome of the war is the most reliable elimination of the Russian threat. But for Europe, the best outcome is not necessarily a Russia that has collapsed and been weakened as much as possible. Rather, it is a Russia that has been defeated, has renounced its imperial policies, but has retained a functioning state and centralized control over its nuclear weapons.
That is precisely why it makes sense to expect that, following Russia’s defeat, the interests of Ukraine and Western countries will partly align and partly diverge. It will be extremely important for Ukraine to secure guarantees, reparations, and to prevent a new attack. At the same time, the West must achieve this while preventing Russia—or any part of it—from becoming a “nuclear Somalia.”
Given Ukraine’s economic dependence on its partners—which will only intensify after the end of hostilities—our country’s leaders will have to demonstrate a great deal of knowledge and skill, particularly in the international arena.
Ігор Льов