March 10, 2025, 7:49 a.m.
(Photo: ANF)
The Kurds are a people who do not have their own country. For a long time, they were part of the Ottoman Empire. The hope for the formation of Kurdistan emerged after the end of World War I, but it proved to be in vain, as Western countries were interested in establishing good relations with the newly created Turkey. After the Second World War, the Kurds found themselves in four countries-Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Throughout the twentieth century, they continued to make attempts to form an independent country.
The Kurds were most active in this direction in Turkey, where the Kurdistan Workers' Party (hereinafter - PKK) was founded in 1978. Since 1984, the PKK has been fighting against the Turkish government, which has continued to this day. Over 40 thousand people were killed during the fighting. As a result of the fighting, PKK units were forced to retreat to neighboring Iraq and Syria, where they continued to be pursued by Turkish troops but supported by local Kurds.
On February 27, 2025, the leader and founder of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been in a Turkish prison since 1999, sent an appeal to the members of the organization. In it, he asked the PKK members to lay down their arms and dissolve the organization. We decided to talk to Mykhailo Shabanov, associate professor of political science at the Technikov Institute of Political Science, about whether Öcalan's appeal could put an end to 40 years of hostilities.
Mykhailo Shabanov. Photo: Intent/Natalia Dovbysh
I have counted six cases when Turkey and the PKK have concluded a truce. Why is it that this time the global media community is so hopeful for a lasting peace?
First of all, the position of a peacemaker is currently beneficial for Recep Erdogan amid the destabilization of the global security system. In addition, he claims to be a leader in the region, and the resolution of the Kurdish issue opens a window of opportunity for this. We should also take into account the conflict in Syria, where Turkey has actively supported its own proxies. Ocalan's unexpected release from prison is a marker of Turkey's desire to resolve the Kurdish issue. There must have been an impetus for such rhetoric related to his situation.
Turkey has a ten-thousand-strong contingent in neighboring Syria. Ankara also supports militias in the north of the country that until recently fought against the Bashar al-Assad regime. Turkey also has good relations with the new Syrian government. Ankara's goal is to push back the Kurdish Syrian groups that support the PKK from its border.
Do I understand you correctly that the high expectations for peace are based on the fact that Erdogan is very interested in peace?
The conflict with the Kurds is a long and protracted story. Erdogan wants to put it on hold for a long time until he has finally consolidated his position in Syria. Of course, he will never make further concessions to the PKK, but will try to follow the path of reconciliation, which could potentially split the political force itself into supporters and opponents of the war with Turkey, as well as continue the resistance both in Syria and on Turkish territory.
If reconciliation is so beneficial to Erdogan, why did Ankara react so sharply to Ocalan's appeal and the PKK's formal agreement to lay down its arms in the sense that it will not make any concessions and does not plan to hold negotiations? After all, it is obvious that the Kurds also want to receive certain benefits from the truce and the possible dissolution of the PKK.
It is important for Ankara to save face in this situation, including by focusing on the wishes of Erdogan's nuclear electorate, which will not accept such decisions, i.e., will actively oppose them. The reconciliation is an attempt to strike the PKK internally. In my opinion, this is a multi-stage process, and it has just begun.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the UN. Photo: ERA
So, for Ankara, the negotiations are a complex and completely non-linear political game? Erdogan must simultaneously save face with the nuclear electorate and still make signs of attention to the Kurds, as peace is important to him. At the same time, his winning card may not be so much the fact of a peace agreement, but even the option of gradually shaking the Kurds and making a split in their ranks.
Trying to find a strategy for gradually leveling Kurdish resistance both in Turkey and abroad is a long process. The path of military confrontation has exhausted itself, but the path of conditional concessions could lead to the splits in the Kurdish resistance that Ankara needs.
In addition, by focusing on the Western world while having significant strategic forces of his own, Erdogan could abandon military action and potentially negotiate, and perhaps even rely on the PKK's peace doves.
Also, in my opinion, there is a moment of shaking the canonical image of Ocalan. He is actually in Erdogan's hands. One of the main tasks is to dismantle the image of the Kurdish leader, to recreate the new line of behavior as much as possible.
Photo of Abdullah Ocalan at a rally of his supporters. Photo: AFP
In the Western media, one can see the opinion that Erdogan aims to change the Constitution and go for a third presidential term. But to make changes, he needs broader support from the population, including the Kurdish community. Therefore, according to English-language sources, by concluding an agreement with the Kurds, he will be able to win additional voters. On the other hand, Turkey and Erdogan personally have caused the Kurds a lot of pain. How likely is the theory that the Kurds could support Erdogan in amending the Constitution and his claims in a hypothetical election?
If Erdogan offers them mutually beneficial conditions, some Kurds will support him. Changing the Constitution is likely because Turkey is first and foremost a hybrid political regime with an authoritarian leadership at the helm. And Erdogan has already gone through a lot during his long tenure in power, including attempts to stage a coup. The recent election results also demonstrated the strength of the united opposition. So, we need to take extraordinary steps.
This is not the first time that Abdullah Ocalan has proposed a truce. However, the PKK has not achieved its goals. In his address, Ocalan said that times have changed and demands for Kurdish independence or even autonomy are no longer relevant. The main thing now, he said, is to strengthen democracy and political pluralism within Turkey. Do the words of the leader of the armed group mean that his views have changed radically?
His views have not changed, but there is probably pressure on him from Turkey. This statement actually cuts off most of the political leaders of the Kurdish resistance. Ankara 's maneuver in this direction achieves a strategic goal, as many Kurds both in Turkey and abroad will not lay down their arms.
Representatives of the PKK have stated that they are ready to lay down their arms as long as they are not attacked. At the same time, their statement did not mention the PKK's self-dissolution, which was also mentioned by Ocalan. How likely is it that the PKK will not fully comply with Ocalan's request?
I am sure that there will be reasons and opportunities not to fulfill it. There will be a temporary ceasefire and resistance, but it will only be a respite for both sides. Especially since Erdogan needs to make up his mind about power in Syria, to get all the levers of influence, and therefore the Kurdish issue can be put on hold.
So you don't believe that an agreement between the Turks and the PKK will be concluded in the near future, which will finally put an end to the war?
Unfortunately, the war is prolonged under these circumstances. For now, it is rather a temporary measure. The PKK leadership, like the Turkish leadership, needs to save face with the most radical part of the electorate. Given the sufficiently deepening and long history of this conflict, where the Kurdish side, among other things, has been implacably trying to achieve its own statehood and unite the people into a single entity, it is unlikely that this will be possible now. Perhaps Ocalan's appeal is also an attempt by the Kurdish side to demonstrate its readiness for conditional concessions or to find new external allies to perform an advocacy function.
Assuming that the two sides do start the negotiation process, what could the PKK possibly demand from Ankara under the current circumstances?
Under the current circumstances, the demands could range from the release of Ocalan to the decriminalization of its own resistance movement. Perhaps also the release of PKK representatives. At this stage, this is natural. Turkey will never give in to demands to strengthen Kurdistan's political subjectivity.
The PKK is considered a terrorist organization in Turkey, the United States and the EU. In your opinion, is its activity closer to terrorism or to the national liberation movement?
Actually, the methods of achieving the goal are terrorist. In relation to Turkey, certainly.
Mykhailo Shabanov. Photo: Intent/Natalia Dovbysh
It seems that there are a number of similar historical periods in the history of the Ukrainian and Kurdish peoples. If so, how legitimate would it be to compare, for example, the activities of the OUN-UPA and the PKK?
In my opinion, there are still more differences. The OUN's activities, among other things, were the result of the geopolitical circumstances in which Ukrainians found themselves and the desire to act by political means, where it is acceptable and possible. In addition, one should take into account the divergent positions after the split between the OUN(b) and OUN(m). The situation of confrontation between the PKK and Turkey should be transformed into a political one. This is what we should strive for, but it is unlikely to happen for now.
Could the outcome of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and the events in Syria, where the government has changed, affect the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war?
There is no doubt that the Russian-Ukrainian war will have an impact on the developments in Syria. The withdrawal of the Russian armed forces has enabled Syrian rebels to dismantle the Assad regime. A potential peace plan on this issue could help strengthen Ankara, and its strengthening could contribute to Erdogan's peacekeeping activities in Ukraine. A strong Turkey means weakening the so-called Russia in the Black Sea basin. Ukraine needs this.
Олег Пархітько