22 березня 2024 р. 22:02
(Image: Center of Public Investigations)
On the night of March 2, 2024, Odesa was massively attacked by enemy combat drones known as "Shaheds". Seven Russian UAVs were shot down over the Odesa region, but one of them, manoeuvring over residential buildings, hit a high-rise building in Odesa. As a result of the attack, the entire section of the nine-story building on Dobrovolskogo Street was destroyed: 18 apartments were obliterated, and dozens more were damaged. The blast also damaged central heating networks, leaving several blocks of apartments, a kindergarten, and a school without heating.
But the most terrible aspect is the loss of human lives. The enemy drone killed 12 people, including five children. The youngest child was only three months old. Another 20 residents were injured. This is currently the most tragic terrorist attack in the city in terms of the number of child victims. Since one of the sections of the Odesa high-rise building simply collapsed, the nature of the damage to the block of apartments that basically buried people underneath immediately raised many questions.
The Center of Public Investigations decided to investigate what kind of "Shaheds" currently attack Ukraine and find out the names of the Russians that may be involved.
Lies of the Kremlin's mouthpieces
As had happened many times before, once numerous casualties were reported in Odesa, Kremlin propagandists released a series of materials claiming that Ukraine was the one to blame as it was a Ukrainian air defence missile that destroyed the building.
For example, the Russian portal Mirtesen (SmallWorld) labelled all reports of a drone attack on Odesa and the resulting destruction of a high-rise building as fake news. As evidence, Russian so-called journalists referred to a post by the Telegram channel Tipichnaya Odessa ("Typical Odesa") currently administrated from Russia. The allegedly intact drone, reported by the Ukrainian Air Force, made it to the port, and the apartments were destroyed by a Ukrainian air defence missile.
Another Russian portal titled its "report" about the Russian drone attack on 2 March 2024 "Victims of Ukrainian Air Defence." It presented Russian military experts’ "analysis" of the damage. They concluded that the "Shahed" could not have caused such destruction and that a Ukrainian missile hit the building. This "analysis" was picked up by other propagandists, who began to assert in various ways that the Iranian-Russian UAV was not capable of such destruction.
The lies of Russian propagandists are contradicted by the published video of the 2-March drone attack. It shows the flying Shahed and the explosion after it hit the house. In addition, the wreckage of an Iranian-Russian drone, not a Ukrainian missile, was found at the site of the tragedy. However, Ukrainian officials have also spoken about the extraordinary power of the explosion.
Photo CPI/ Natalia Dovbysh
The powerful warhead
The Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Andrii Kostin, indicated that for the first time in Odesa, the aftermath of the city's drone attack resembled the impact of a missile strike: "Previously, such impact could only be caused by missile hits… I don't remember any other case where a drone attack led to this."
Natalia Humeniuk, the head of the Joint Coordination Press Centre of the Southern Defence Forces, also highlighted that Odesa was likely attacked by modified drones, "Recently, we have observed enemy attempts to launch drones at very low altitudes. It lets them somewhat evade our air defence systems, making them harder to detect and complicating our efforts to shoot them down. They fly low over the sea level and then suddenly rise to the altitude from which they strike. The enemy is also modifying their drones and changing engines and warheads. Therefore, it is quite likely that the warhead could have been reinforced, resulting in such destruction. However, this will be determined by the investigation, expert analysis, and the relevant specialists."
Natalia Gumeniuk comments on the Russian attack on a high-rise building. Photo: CPI, Natalia Dovbysh
At the same time, former air defence spokesman Yuriy Ihnat commented to CPI that a "panel house stands no chance" against a "Shahed". "Munition can have a variety of warheads. This is for the experts... But an ordinary "Shahed" can do this to a building section. When the construction is made of panels, it's like a house of cards."
That night, Russia launched kamikaze drones at Odesa from the Black Sea.
The CPI has already investigated that Cape Chauda near Feodosia is currently at the disposal of the Russian State Flight Test Centre, Named after Chkalov. It is a Crimea-based military unit 38651. Russia’s most significant centre is located in Aktiubinsk, Astrakhan region, and has a number of branches across the RF. The Centre is headed by Major General Radyk Bariyev.
Russians modify Iranian "Shaheds"
In response to our enquiry, the Centre for Research of Trophy and Advanced Weapons and Military Equipment of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine confirmed that Russian specialists significantly powered up Iranian "Shahed-136" type UAVs. It is likely that these modified kamikaze drones attacked Odesa.
In particular, the Centre points out the following: "Shahed-136" type UAVs, produced at the enterprises of the Russian Federation, have a more powerful warhead compared to similar UAVs produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, a new type of UAV warhead produced in Russia has more explosives – 37 kg v. previous 20 kg. It also has a different chemical composition, which increases the blast scope and the explosion’s thermal effect. In Russia, Iranian drones are called "Geran" (Geraniums).
When asked about the use of "Shaheds" with reinforced warheads in Ukrainian cities, the Centre replied that they had already recorded the incidences of attacks with modified made-in-Russia UAVs before. However, experts currently do not know which "Shahed" modification was launched at Odesa on 2 March 2024.
Meanwhile, in the autumn of 2023, analysts recorded only "cosmetic" Shahed modifications, primarily to reduce production costs. For example, just five months ago, during a briefing participated by Andrii Rudyk, a representative of the Centre for Research of Trophy and Advanced Weapons and Military Equipment, he said: "The so-called new Shahed-136 (or Geran-2, as it is called in the Russian Federation) does not fundamentally differ from earlier models. Their tactical and technical characteristics are identical. The described differences are cosmetic and aimed at achieving a banal goal: reducing this loitering munition’s production cost. The replacement of Shahed-136 or Geran-2 parts also proves the effectiveness of foreign sanctions and Russia's desire to unify the production of unmanned aerial vehicles and other so-called high-tech production."
The SBU in the Odesa region opened proceedings over the deliberate attack on the city on 2 March 2024 by Russian servicemen, which is a violation of the laws and customs of war. No one has yet been indicted for this crime.
This is certainly not the first time that Odesa and the region have come under fire from the Shahed drones. In the summer of 2023, after Russia withdrew from the Grain Deal, grain terminals and port infrastructure were attacked by Iranian-Russian kamikaze drones and missiles. At that time, law enforcement officers opened 16 proceedings.
Increasing production
In 2023, it became known that the Russians were working on deploying their own Shahed UAVs, rebranded as "Gerans" in Russia. The Washington Post published an investigation into the UAV production deployment in Tatarstan in the Alabuga Special Economic and Industrial Zone in August last year. Allegedly, by the summer of 2025, Russia plans to produce six thousand Shahed kamikaze drones at its own facilities.
The Institute for Science and International Security report dated 13 November 2023 indicates that Russia continues to build Shahed UAV production facilities in Alabuga. The report also notes that the United States has not yet imposed sanctions on those involved.
Later, in February, the United States eventually imposed sanctions on the Alabuga Special Economic Zone for Industrial and Production. Currently, in addition to Ukraine and the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the European Union have also joined the sanctions.
According to the plans of the so-called Russian Ministry of Defence, published in the report, by February 2024, Alabuga has probably already kick-started its own kamikaze drone production.
Image: Institute for Science and International Security
In March, the Russians published photos and videos of the alleged workshops that produce Shaheds. In his post on the matter, Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military and political observer at the Information Resistance group, says that the "workspace" photos published by the propagandists "allows to assemble up to fifty drones at a time". This indicates that the planned production volumes of "Shaheds"/"Gerans" have not been met so far. In addition, Ukrainian intelligence regularly reports on the supply of kamikaze drones from Iran.
Production of Shaheds/Gerans in Russia
Did they pay with gold?
What also begs the question is how much Russia pays for the Shaheds. For example, the SafeReactor portal published information on the price of the kamikaze drones paid by the Russian Federation. It was obtained from a hacked and leaked dump from the mail server of the Iranian company IRGC Sahara Thunder.
This company allegedly licensed the Shaheds production. Initially, one kamikaze drone cost Russia $375,000. After negotiations, the price of Shaheds was reduced to $193,000 for a batch of six thousand units and $290,000 for a batch of two thousand units.
The total price of the production contract, including the technology transfer, equipment, six thousand UAV kits, and software, is 108.5 billion roubles or $1.75 billion. This is comparable to 2% of the entire 2023 Russian military budget.
Notably, the leaked documents show that a part of the Shahed's settlement was paid to Iran in gold. Namely, two tonnes of gold.
The Iranian company Sahara Thunder's website is currently inactive. However, it was still operative in early 2024. The web archive shows what the site looked like on 22 January.
According to the description of Sahara Thunder's activities on its official website, the company is focused on working with foreign partners. It specialises in construction, equipment supplies, and technologies, particularly for the oil industry, etc.
The Sahara Thunder website shutdown coincided with the leaked documents' publication. According to open sources, the company's legal address is 33 13th Street, Tehran. A map marks one of the skyscrapers in the Iranian capital.
We emailed Sahara Thunder asking them to comment on the kamikaze drones' supply to Russia, which are used to attack Ukrainian cities. However, the company's email address seems no longer available.
Ukrainian experts estimated the cost of the "Shaheds" at twenty-forty thousand dollars. Oleh Katkov, the editor-in-chief of Defence Express, said they could cost up to $100,000 for the Russian Federation.
After the article was prepared, Euromaidan Press editor Alia Shandra posted that the documents on how much the Russian Federation pays for "Shaheds" could be fake, just like the mail hack itself.
Under the "Alabuga" sign
Supposedly, the Alabuga Machinery Company and its official head, Nikolay Aftapov, are among the Russian parties to the Shaheds production contract with Iran. Ukraine has already imposed sanctions on him.
According to the Rusprofile Russian system, Alabuga Machinery, headed by Nikolay Aftapov, was registered on 3 October 2022. The company's founders are two companies – GEA and Alabuga Development. The latter has received government orders totalling approximately RUB 128 billion. Alabuga Development has been registered since 2016.
We found Nikolay Aftapov's locked profile on the Russian social network Vkontakte and texted him to ask for comment on the deadly Shahed strikes in Ukraine. He read the message but never replied.
Moreover, Aftapov later changed his profile name and photo and restricted the ability to message him. Then, he deleted his profile from the social network altogether.
Notably, the profile of Nikolay Nakipovich Aftapov from Elabuga in Tatarstan is still active on the maths tutors’ website. He charges or used to charge 800 roubles for an hour-long lesson. Here, you can also find an uploaded engineering degree diploma from South Ural State University, awarded in 2015.
It is likely that Aftapov is only a figurehead in Alabuga Machinery. On 10 December 2023, this company issued two conformity declarations for the serial production certification of a radio navigation equipment receiver and a Dikonglieren control unit for a period of five years, i.e. until 10 December 2028. The manufacturer is the Chinese company Jigang Defence Technology.
It is also worth mentioning that the Molfar community managed to de-anonymise several direct Shaheds producers in Russia.
In 2023, the Alabuga Special Economic Zone was in the spotlight of a long promotional video. It did not talk about the production of Shaheds used by Russia to kill Ukrainians.
Screenshot from the video
However, this Alabuga's promotional video gives a glimpse of some peculiar information. For example, it evidences the fact that international companies continue to operate in Russia: "We have 33 operating plants on our territory, and about 20 more are under construction, at the commissioning stage. These are both international and Russian companies. In Alabuga, only Ford has left..." said an Alabuga Zone representative.
According to her, the Danish company Rockwool and the German manufacturer Knauf, for example, have not left the Russian market.
So far, there is no official confirmation whether Odesa was attacked on 2nd of March with modified "Shaheds" wearing reinforced Alabuga-produced warheads. But the nature of the damage suggests so.
In addition, Russians are known to have already reinforced Iranian kamikaze drones, making them even more dangerous. At the same time, international companies continue to operate in Alabuga – next door to where the Russians produce deadly weapons.
It is obvious that the aggressor country is ready to spend large amounts of money and resources on the production of weapons against Ukrainians. And for the Russians, it makes no difference whether they hit military targets or civilians. It seems their main goal is terror and murder.
Олена Чернишова